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Residential Landlord-Tenant Law:
A Survey of Modern Problems
with Reference to the
Proposed Model Code
By GERALD R. GIBBONS*
IT was no more than 5 years ago that the law of landlord-tenant could
be characterized by several generalizations. 1 Long-term commercial
and industrial lease problems dominated the field; residential tenancies
especially short-term leases, were given little attention by the courts or
the legislatures. Residential landlord-tenant law remained relatively
unchanged since the feudal era. Such legislation as existed was fre-
quently 19th-century in origin with few modem changes.2 Because the
amounts involved in short-term lease disputes were generally too small
to justify appeals from trial court judgments, appellate case law was
sparse, and some topics were devoid of useful precedent in many juris-
dictions. Any case law that existed was often old-fashioned, confused,
parochial and conflicting. Above all, it was frequently irrelevant. The
actual law governing disputes in this area was embodied in the customs
of landlords, the practices of judges in minor courts, and to some de-
gree, in the terms of standard form leases. The field was not generally
considered appropriate for study by legal scholars, who were geared to
* A.B., 1954, LL.B., 1956, LL.M., 1960, Duke University; SJ.D., 1966, Columbia
University; Professor of Law, Rutgers University-Camden.
1. Compare the remarks of Professor Powell regarding residential periodic
tenancies: "This type of estate is tremendously important sociologically in that occu-
pancy thereunder conditions the home life of a very substantial fraction of the popu-
lation. On the other hand, the financial smallness of the involved rights results in a
great dearth of reported decisions from the courts concerning them. Their legal con-
sequences are chiefly fixed in the 'over the counter' mass handling of 'landlord and
tenant' cases of the local courts. So this type of estate, judged sociologically, is of
great importance, but judged on the basis of its jurisprudential content, is almost neg-
ligible." R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 177-78 (abr. ed. 1968).
2. The legislation referred to is the local version of the summary eviction act,
the forcible detainer statute borrowed from England and, in many states, a codification
of the common la)v of distress. E.g., CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. §§ 1159-79a; DEL. CODE
'wiN. tit. 25, § 5501 (1953).
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investigations limited to libraries. Thus, while there was active interest
in personal injury litigation by residential tenants against landlords, the
writing on other aspects of the landlord-tenant relation was small in
quantity and essentially local in scope.
This picture has changed markedly in a brief period of time. The
volume of published material on residential landlord-tenant law has in-
creased significantly. Much of it has focused on problems of public
housing3 or enforcement of housing code standards of repair against
landlords.4 A good deal that has been written on residential land-
lord-tenant relations and the poor has been a one-sided emotional advo-
cacy of changes in the law for the benefit of the tenant. Nevertheless,
this writing has produced a wider awareness of problems and practices
in this area and has stimulated thinking toward changes in the law.
While field research into the extent and consequences of various prac-
tices is still badly needed, 5 a sense of being closer to the realities of the
problem is being conveyed in publications by bright, energetic and
articulate young attorneys who have been imported by the hundreds
into landlord-tenant courts to represent low-income tenants. These
attorneys operate under the auspices of law school legal aid bureaus
and neighborhood legal services programs,' which are funded primarily
by grants from the federal Office of Economic Opportunity.
7
The spurt of intellectual activity in this field has recently been
capped by a tentative draft of the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code, produced under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation.8
3. See note 155 infra.
4. As to enforcement of housing codes against landlords by public agencies
see L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION
44-72 (1968); Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78
HARV. L. REV. 801 (1965). Due, in part to the lack of conspicuous success of public
sanctions, attention recently has focused more on sanctions available to pri- ate parties,
such as rent withholding on an individual basis or by a group of tenants acting in
concert; that is, the rent strike. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
5. One recent attempt to gather data, via questionnaires, is reported in Note,
Self Help Eviction: Proposals for the Reform of Eviction Procedures in New Jersey,
1 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. Fall Issue 1969.
6. A few short years ago the difficulty of recruiting enough students into these
programs to keep them going was an embarrassment at many schools. Now the con-
cern is much more likely to be to persuade that students will overcommit themselves in
this work and sacrifice their other course obligations.
7. The organization and rapid growth of these programs in a short period of time
and the increase in the quality of the talent attracted to work for them has been
nothing short of phenomenal.
8. The Model Code was drafted by Juilan H. Levi, Philip Hablutzel, Lou:s
Rosenberg and James White under a grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity
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This proposed code, which is limited to residential tenancies, was drafted
for the purpose of stimulating discussion on specific recommendations.'
Although the Model Code generally favors the tenant's position on a
number of current controversial issues,10 the rejection by the drafters of
some proposed tenant-oriented reforms indicates that the Code is by no
means one-sided." Indeed, the draftsmen were keenly aware of the
necessity of making the provisions as fair as possible to the landlord,
realizing that otherwise the Model Code would not be seriously treated
as a proposal for legislation.'" While much of the Model Code consists
of clarification and restatement of the common law,' 3 it nevertheless
performs a valuable service by specifying detailed guidelines on issues
seldom litigated on appeal. Reference to the positions adopted by the
Model Code will be made throughout this paper where applicable.
I. Summary Eviction Procedures
Prior to the middle of the last century, landlords seeking a legal
remedy to remove tenants from their property were confined to a suit
in ejectment, a cause of action that had become overgrown with pro-
cedural complexities. 4 Ejectment could be maintained only in courts
of general jurisdiction, where lengthy notice provisions for pleadings
and crowded court calendars meant a substantial delay before hearing.
This remedy was expensive, time-consuming, and needlessly compli-
cated, considering the volume of litigation and the simplicity of issues
involved. 5 Responses to this problem were so varied among the states
to the American Bar Foundation, which published the draft in 1969. It consists of 76
pages of draft legislation and comments, preceded by a 15 page introduction. Copies
can be acquired from the American Bar Foundation, 1155 East 60th St., Chicago,
Illinois.
9. Levi & Hablutzel, Preface to AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE 1 (Tent. Draft 1969) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
The need to focus discussion on particular proposals is evident. While the present
version is a tentative draft, it appears to be the intention of the drafters to move
quickly from a tentative to a final stage of submitting draft legislation to the
Commissioners on Uniform State Legislation by the beginning of 1971. Telephone
Interview with Professor Julian H. Levi. As a result, the opportunity to effect a
modification of the present proposals by criticism at this crucial stage appears to
be rather limited.
10. The conclusion of this paper summarizes the proposals adopted and rejected
by the drafters of the Model Code. See text accompanying note 221 infra.
11. See Levi & Hablutzel, Preface to the MODEL CODE 2.
12. Id. at 1-2.
13. Id. at 1.
14. H. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 215, 278-86 (1910).
15. The basic issue is the right to possession as between landlord and tenant.
See, e.g., Roberts v. Eastman, 134 Misc. 677, 236 N.Y.S. 353 (1929).
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that generalizations are difficult. However, the general response was the
statutory creation of a special summary proceeding to be brought in a
court of limited subject matter jurisdiction. 6 The objects were to give
landlords a prompt, inexpensive remedy to remove tenants, 17 to lighten
the workload of the courts of general jurisdiction, and to induce land-
lords to employ legal process instead of self-help evictions.'
A. Scope of the Proceeding
In most jurisdictions the proceeding is treated like other civil suits.
The landlord can, and usually does, ask for a judgment for rent then
due; and the tenant is permitted to present any counterclaims he has
available against the landlord within the dollar limits of the court's
jurisdiction. 9 In several states, however, the proceeding is limited by
statute to an action for possession only; neither landlord or tenant may
request rent or damages."
For the most part, landlord-tenant courts operate as a mill, running
on high volume and limited administrative resources. Except for a
few long-term commercial or residential lease disputes, the great bulk
of the cases involve short-term periodic tenancies. The issues are
usually cut-and-dried: Did the tenant default in rent, was the notice
to quit served at the right time, were the summons and complaint prop-
erly served on the tenant? The majority of the cases go by default.
2'
16. See 3A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 1370 (J.S. Grimes ed. repl. ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as THOMPSON].
The name of the proceeding varies from state to state. The most common terms are
"unlawful detainer" and "summary dispossess."
17. Id. § 1492, at 648.
18. Tri-State Refreshments, Inc. v. Nitke, 41 Misc. 2d 368, 246 N.Y.S.2d 79
(Broome County Ct. 1964), where the court stated: "It has long been stated that the
[summary eviction] statutes are the re-enactment of a long series of laws for the pri-
mary purpose of preventing landlords from taking the law into their own hands and
ejecting tenants by violence." Id. at 390, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 83. See text accompany-
ing note 186 infra.
19. E.g., Seidenberg v. Burka, 106 A.2d 499 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1954); Wilson
v. Watt, 327 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. 1959).
20. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-532 (1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
18-53 (1952). On balance, this limitation has probably been beneficial to defaulting
tenants, since often landlords do not bother to file a separate suit for a rent judgment.
In jurisdictions where rent judgments are taken automatically in the same suit, the
landlord sometimes finds a later use for them, such as garnishing the tenant's wages or
attaching his household goods at the time of repossession.
21. For example, during the court year 1967-68 in New Jersey 25,019 eviction
proceedings were carried to a hearing by landlords, of which, 17,013, or approxi-
mately 68 percent, were won by default. ANNUAL REPORT OF N.J. ADMINISTRATIVE
DIRECTOR OF COURTS 1967-1968, table F-i, at 109 [hereinafter cited as N.J. ANNUAL
REPORT].
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In those that are contested, the tenant usually loses; when he does win,
the reason is frequently improper service 22 and the landlord is soon
back in court.
B. Jury Trials
In many jurisdictions, either party may request a jury trial in evic-
tion proceedings,2" but judges have discouraged their use because of the
volume of cases. In some jurisdictions a jury trial is avoided by express
waiver; others require that a demand be made by one of the parties, and
in these jurisdictions a jury trial is avoided because the landlord does
not request one and the tenant ordinarily is not informed of his right
to one.24 Occasionally, the tenant waives a trial by jury by a provision
in the lease.25 Another limitation sometimes placed on a tenant's
right to a jury trial is the requirement that there must be a disputed issue
of fact.2"
In the past, it seems that a jury trial generally was unusual in most
landlord-tenant courts. 27  Their use may be reviving, however, as attor-
22. See text accompanying note 174 infra.
23. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1171. This section requires all issues of fact
presented by the pleadings to be tried by a jury unless the jury be waived. See also
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-313 (1948); MINN. STAT. § 566.07 (1947); N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTIONS & PROC. LAW § 745 (1963).
24. Under New Jersey law, the tenant is entitled to a jury trial, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:39-6, 2A:18-16 (1952), on payment of $8.50 for a six-man jury and $14.00 for a
12-man jury, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:2-37 (1969); this right is not subject to limitation be-
cause of an absence of disputed fact. If the tenant makes the request for the first
time at the hearing, he will be deemed to have waived his rights. Tambe v. Otto, 113
N.J.L. 71, 172 A. 544 (Sup. Ct. 1934). The form of summons in use gives the tenant
no indication that he must request a jury trial prior to the hearing. So unless the
tenant is represented by an attorney knowledgeable in such affairs,, he will probably
lose his right to a jury trial even if he would be willing to pay the extra costs. The loss
is substantial, because the costs are small compared to what the tenant receives. Un-
der the current court calendar of Camden County, New Jersey, the backlog of jury
trials in County District Court is such that the hearing would have to be postponed for
three months. If, during this time, the tenant fails to pay rent, the landlord loses an ad-
ditional three months' rent, receiving in turn only a judgment for this extra amount,
which is probably uncollectible. Such a situation raises a strong temptation on the part
of the landlord to obtain satisfaction other than by legal process, i.e., self-help eviction
and/or a distraint of the tenant's goods. The delay caused by the jury trial backlog
could be resolved either by a significant increase in the number of judges and facilities
or the abolition of jury trials in landlord-tenant cases and some other types of disputes.
There are pressures building up for both positions.
25. In at least one state, Illinois, such lease provisions are expressly prohibited
by law. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 57, § lla (Smith-Hurd 1951).
26. This requirement was adopted by the Model Code. MODEL CODE § 3-211.
27. For example, during the court year 1967-68 in New Jersey, of 8,006 con-
tested cases, only three were tried by jury. N.J. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21.
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neys for legal services, sensing a benefit to their tenant clients that
would counterbalance a judge's possible prejudice, have been demand-
ing jury trials with increasing frequency. One consequence is to increase
the expense to landlords in these proceedings, since some landlords who
would handle their own cases before a judge prefer to employ an attor-
ney for a jury trial. Another consequence in many courts is to postpone
the hearing until a jury is impaneled, thus permitting the tenant to
remain in possession longer.2 8
As the tenant's rights are expanded, the possibility of factual dis-
putes will greatly increase. If, in this future context, the practice by
tenants of demanding jury trials becomes widespread, it will result in a
tremendous increase in the workload of landlord-tenant courts. Whether
this pressure will eventually lead to a legislative abolition of jury trials
in landlord-tenant proceedings can be conjectured, though at the present
time such a consequence seems doubtful. The Model Code leaves jury
trials optional,29 but the commentary strongly urges that the provision
for jury trials be omitted. 30 This attitude may represent the sentiments
of many legal scholars; whether it will be politically acceptable is
another matter.
C. Judgment for Possession and Rent
If the tenant loses in the summary eviction proceeding, a judgment
is entered for the landlord, and a warrant of eviction or its equivalent is
issued. If the landlord's suit was brought to recover back rent or dam-
ages to the premises and a separate cause of action was alleged for such
items, a money judgment is also granted.3 The Model Code proposes
that if the judgment is by default and the tenant was served only by
certified mail, no judgment for rent or damages should be granted.32
This provision is certain to cause difficulties because substituted service
by mail is commonly used in many states.3 3 Its enactment would pre-
vent the landlord from obtaining a judgment against the tenant who,
after failing to pay rent or causing substantial damage to the premises,
cannot be personally served. Of course, the problem would be moot in
most cases, since a tenant who avoids the process server will usually
be able to avoid the official who attempts to levy execution to satisfy the
landlord's money judgment.
28. See note 24 supra.
29. MODEL CODE § 3-211.
30. Id. § 3-211 (commentary).
31. See id. §§ 3-208(5), 3-212(1), 3-215(1) and accompanying comments.
32. Id. § 3-213.
33. See text accompanying note 174 infra.
[Vol. 21
MODEL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE
D. Tenant Liability for Court Costs and Landlord's Attorney's Fees
In most jurisdictions the successful landlord in an eviction proceed-
ing is entitled to a judgment against the tenant for court costs, although
apparently there are wide variations between jurisdictions on the
amounts and their calculation. One common procedure is to award
an amount sufficient to cover filing fees and service of process if only
a judgment of eviction is requested.34 If the landlord's cause of action
is for back rent and a rent judgment is also requested, the landlord will
be awarded court costs calculated on a percentage of the rent judg-
ment, this amount to be added to the costs of the judgment for recovery
of possession.35 The amount of these court costs usually is not large.
Nevertheless, they can in some instances constitute a sizable fraction of
monthly rent. The Model Code suggests a limitation of $25 for court
costs where the tenant is in default of rent.36  This figure should be
acceptable since it does not seem out of line with court costs cur-
rently awarded in residential eviction and rent cases in most areas.
While the landlord's court costs may be charged to the losing
tenant as a matter of law, his attorney's fees may not.37  Some lease
forms contain a provision imposing on the tenant the obligation of paying
reasonable attorney's fees if it becomes necessary for the landlord to sue
for possession. A recent New York case,38 however, has held such a
lease provision unenforceable. This result deserves widespread support
and under the Model Code lease provisions for attorney's fees are ex-
pressly made unenforceable.39
E. Discretionary Postponement of Eviction
Several states in the northeast have statutory provisions that auth-
orize judges to stay the execution of a judgment for possession against
the tenant for various lengths of time if he would suffer hardship in
34. Shipley v. McNeel, 149 Neb. 790, 32 N.W.2d 639 (1949); Cunningham v.
Hagyil, 90 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1949) (mandatory under statute).
35. E.g., five percent of the first $500.
36. MODEL CODE § 3-212(4). In New Jersey court costs are $11.10. In New
York they are $4.50.
37. See, e.g., Shipley v. Major, 44 A.2d 540 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1945); Midboro
Manag. v. Epperson, 39 Misc. 2d 908, 242 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1963).
38. Edot Realty Co. v. Levinson, 54 Misc. 2d 673, 283 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1967). The monthly rent due was $77.15, and the legal fees demanded on the
basis of the lease provision were $50.00. The court's opinion did not declare all such'
lease provisions invalid but only held that they could not be enforced against tenants
of low income, as evidenced by the fact that the tenant was represented by the Legal
Aid Society. Id. at 674, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
39. MODEL CODE § 3-402.
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moving out immediately."0 Generally these provisions are applicable
only where the rent is not in default and the landlord's cause of action is
based on termination of the tenancy.41 Sometimes these statutes impose
a number of conditions beyond a continuing obligation to pay rent. A
Connecticut statute,42 for example, requires that the tenant be unable to
secure suitable premises in a reasonably comparable neighborhood in
the same or an adjacent city, that he make a reasonable effort to obtain
such premises, and that he apply for the stay in good faith. 3
Courts in other states seem considerably more lenient in granting
stays of execution against tenants. In New Jersey, for example, it
seems to be common practice to postpone eviction for a month or so
upon any reasonable claim of hardship by the tenant, provided he pays
court costs for the proceeding and all rent then due, and there is no evi-
dence that he is damaging the premises. The degree to which municipal
court judges in other states exercise a similar discretion in postponing
evictions for good cause without explicit statutory authority is unknown;
but it would not be surprising to find that some judges elsewhere
employ, or can be persuaded to employ, this practice. In the com-
mentary in the Model Code, the drafters state that they rejected a pro-
posed provision for stay of execution on grounds of hardship.
44
F. Appeals
Little of the vast iceberg of residential landlord-tenant law is dis-
cernable from written court opinions because the cost of appeals has
outweighed the amounts at stake in litigation. In the past, any appeals
that were taken were usually "grudge" suits, where emotions caused
monetary values to be overlooked. This situation is changing, however;
if the tenant is fortunate enough to have a legal service program available
and is knowledgeable enough to employ it, he can acquire a free liti-
gator, to whom an appeal is an eagerly sought after opportunity.
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-546 (Supp. 1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
239, §§ 9-10 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.6 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTIONS & PROC. LAW § 751 (McKinney 1963). The Massachusetts act was
first adopted in 1927, at which time the period of postponement was set at one month.
From 1946 to 1957 the statute was amended nine times to change the outside dura-
tion of discretionary stays, the period varying from two months for a farm employer
under a 1950 amendment, to 12 months under the 1948 act. A 1967 statute reduced
the aggregate time period to three months. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 9
(Supp. 1969).
41. See note 40 supra.
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-546 (Supp. 1969).
43. Id.
44. General Introduction to MODEL CODE 18.
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In this situation, the landlord is at a financial disadvantage and is
usually willing to enter into a settlement. 5
A legal limitation on the use of appeals in some states46 is the re-
quirement that the tenant post a bond to cover rent that may accrue dur-
ing the appeal as a condition of an order to stay issuance of a judgment
entitling the landlord to possession. Because the impetus for appeals
by tenants derives largely from legal service programs, which are avail-
able only to low-income clients who cannot afford such bonds, ap-
peals by tenants in these states have been effectively denied.4 Statutory
45. A lower court judgment is not automatically vacated or reversed by an ap-
peal in which the winning party below fails to file a brief or make an appearance at an
appellate hearing. The appellate court may decide the case on the briefs alone after
listening to argument by only one party.
46. In one state, New Jersey, summary eviction proceedings in the county
district court are nonappealable by statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (1952).
However, there are two other methods by which the tenant's right to possession may be
brought before the superior court, a court of general jurisdiction whose decisions are
subject to appeal. One is to bring a suit to enjoin the landlord from proceeding with
the summary eviction in the district court. At present it is not clear whether this
approach is even permitted as prior case law is in disarray. The other method is to
apply for transfer to the superior court at the discretion of that court, the transfer
apparently being dependent on the public importance of the issues involved.
Master Auto Parts, Inc. v. M & M Shoes, Inc., 105 N.J. Super. 49, 251 A.2d 135
(App. Div. 1969). Neither course can be employed after final judgment in the district
court, and the tenant is then limited to a suit for damages for wrongful eviction.
Both alternatives require that the district court judge be willing to postpone the hearing
while papers are prepared and presented to the superior court. For discussion, see
authorities cited note 5 supra. The New Jersey prohibition of appeals was unsuccess-
fully challenged as a violation of procedural due process in Randell v. Newark Housing
Authority, 384 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), where an injunction was sought in federal
court to enjoin the enforcement of warrants of eviction issued by a state court. The
Third Circuit stated that on the whole the state statutory scheme appeared to guaran-
tee due process to the tenant. Id. at 156.
47. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 5 (1959).
48. The effect of the requirement is that the tenant must put up collateral with a
surety company equal to as much as a year's rent in advance, as well as to pay for the
bond. In the many states with statutes authorizing the landlord to demand double
rent from the overstaying tenant, see note 156 fnfra, the amount of collateral demanded
may be doubled.
In one case in Chicago, a legal service attorney was able to persuade the re-
sponsible state official, Justice Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court, to stay an evic-
tion of low-income tenants and permit an appeal by the offer of a "use and occupancy
bond," which was essentially no more than a promise to pay rent as it came due during
the time of the appeal and a deposit to cover appellate court costs. Hartland Realty,
Inc. v. Clark, OEO Pov. L. REP. f '2235.90, at 3146 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1967); Interview
with George Ranney, Jr., Chicago Legal Aid Bureau attorney. Mr. Ranney also gave
assistance and advice in the drafting of the Model Code, but he was apparently un-
successful in influencing the drafters to adopt a provision that would clarify the
legitimacy of the substitute bond device he had used earlier. See note 51 infra.I I
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requirements, such as those referred to, have been challenged and up-
held in a recent Connecticut case.49  The decision, however, is being
appealed to the United States Supreme Court90 where a reversal would
open the way for judicial reform of residential landlord-tenant law in a
number of states. 51
G. Moving and Storage Costs in Official Repossessions
After a warrant of eviction is issued, it is sent to the office of the
court official responsible for its enforcement. In some jurisdictions,
the official is required to give the tenant 24 hours notice.52 Even in
states that do not require this, some advance notice is often given be-
cause officials prefer that the tenant move voluntarily or at least have
time to adjust himself to the idea of a peaceful move.53 The Model
Code provides for one day's advance notice to the tenant and requires
that the move be accomplished during normal business hours.54
When the public official serves the eviction warrant and accom-
plishes a forcible repossession, the tenant's goods may be dealt with in
one of three possible ways. First, they can simply be left on the side-
walk for the tenant to worry about. This is a common procedure in
49. West Haven Housing Authority v. Simmons, 5 Conn. Cir. 282, 250 A.2d 527
(App. Div. 1968), prob. furis. noted, 394 U.S. 957 (1969).
50. Id.
51. Section 3-214 of the Model Code provides that, in order to remain in posses-
sion during the appeal, the tenant must file a "bond, or other assurances as may be re-
quired by the court, to the effect that the tenant will pay all costs of such appeal ...
[and] all rent and other damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency
of such proceedings." Except for the provision that the trial court may accept some
"other assurance," e.g., the promise to pay rent as it comes due and a small deposit to
cover appeal costs if tenant loses, the code provision is the same as the Connecticut
statute that was challenged on constitutional grounds. See note 49 & accompanying
text supra.
For the reasons stated in note 48 supra, the code provision is of debatable merit.
A provision clearly permitting a "use and occupancy" bond of the type suggested in
that note would be preferable. If the tenant fails to pay rent during the appeal, the
landlord should be permitted to declare a forfeit of the deposit for costs and have the
stay of enforcement of the eviction terminated. Although the landlord may have ex-
pended attorney's fees in preparing for the appeal at the time of tenant's default, these
fees are not recoverable even if he wins. Perhaps additional safeguards are necessary
to prevent abuse by the tenant, such as a deposit that would cover one-half of an arbi-
trary figure as the landlord's estimated attorney's fees.
52. In New York as the result of the 1966 amendment, the marshal must give
the tenant 72 hours notice of eviction instead of the previously required 24 hours no-
tice. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS & PROC. LAW § 749(2) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
53. In New Jersey it is customary for the constable to give the tenant a 24 hour
notice before enforcement of the warrant of removal.
54. MODEL CODE § 3-215(2).
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small towns in many states, and in some sizable cities, especially in the
South. This procedure can be very unfortunate for the tenant because if
he is not at home, or his neighbors do not stand guard, his goods can
be stolen or destroyed. A second possibility is that the landlord may be
required to move the tenant's goods at his own cost to a public storage
facility or to a location selected by the tenant within the city.55 Under
such a procedure, a public official will normally not perform the
eviction unless the landlord has a truck and movers available. How-
ever, if the landlord has storage space in the building and the tenant is
not present to direct that the goods be sent elsewhere, removal to the
landlord's area is usually permitted by the official since the purposes of
this procedure are to protect the tenant's goods and prevent them from
littering the street. The third possibility, followed in some northern
cities, is that the city itself will take responsibility for the moving and
storage. The city may perform this service at its own expense,5 6 charge
the landlord,57 or charge the tenant.58
Thus, in some areas the tenant is required to pay the moving and
storage expenses, while in others the landlord has this burden although
sometimes he may be permitted to pass on the cost to the tenant if he
can.59 If the cost is borne by the tenant and he was not present to
direct the moving, he may end up having to pay again to have his goods
55. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174, as amended in 1968, requires the landlord
to pay the costs of removing the tenant's property. It also permits the landlord to
store the property on the premises and charge the tenant storage in the amount of the
fair rental value of the storage area. If the tenant does not remove the property within
30 days, it is deemed abandoned and may be sold at a public sale.
56. A California statute that provides for the costs of removal to be absorbed by
the public rather than the landlord, was held invalid by a trial court as violative of a
state constitutional provision against the expenditure of public funds for private liabili-
ties. Lopez v. Kelsay, OEO Pov. L. REP. 2230.24, at 3144 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1968).
The statute was thereupon replaced by the amendment cited note 55 supra, placing the
expense back on the landlord. The practice in the City of New York was for the city
to move and store the tenant's household goods without charge. The mayor attempted
to change this by an administrative order to the marshal's office to charge the cost to
the landlord. A court then held that the city was under a duty to keep the streets
clean, and that to charge the landlord with the cost of performing this public duty
could only be accomplished by an ordinance. 667 East 187th Street Corp. v. Lind-
say, 54 Misc. 2d 632, 283 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
57. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174.
58. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 4 (1959).
59. A recent advisory opinion of the Attorney General of Kentucky was re-
ported to conclude that the sheriff's expense in removing the tenant from possession
should be an item of cost taxed to the tenant. Thus, the landlord must pay for re-
moval of the tenant initially, but the expense can be added to any judgment he recovers
against the tenant. Ky. Ops. ATr'y GEN. No. 68-340, OEO Pov. L. REP. f 2230.55,
at 3144 (1968).
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moved to his new apartment.
These procedures are sometimes governed by state statutes and
sometimes by city ordinances; more frequently, they are local adminis-
trative practices or even the preferences of individual officials. Despite
the lack of uniformity in procedure, it is questionable whether this
area of law is suitable for clarification by state legislation under the
guidance of a proposed uniform law. While the idea that there may be
overriding local considerations probably should be discounted, there are
substantial policy objections that would at least limit the scope of any
legislation in this area. There probably would be substantial objection
by fearful legislators with urban cdnstituencies to imposing the costs of
moving and storage on the tenant. On the other hand, there seems
little reason to place this cost on the landlord who has given ample
notice to the tenant to move, particularly since it is normally the latter's
obstinancy or neglect that has forced official intervention. The seem-
ingly attractive political compromise of placing the cost burden on the
local municipality probably is also out of the question; local govern-
ments would object and probably could not be forced to comply with
such a legislative rule even if adopted. Except for a rule to prohibit
leaving the tenant's goods on the curb, it appears doubtful that a satis-
factory procedure for moving and storing a dispossessed tenant's goods
will be found in the immediate future.
II. The Landlord's Cause of Action
There are three basic causes of action that the landlord may em-
ploy for an eviction: default in rent, termination for violation of rules,
and expiration of the tenancy.
A. Rent
(1) When is it due?
In all but a small proportion of eviction proceedings, the ground
alleged is default in rent.6 0 At common law, rent was due at the end of
the period for which it was payable unless there was a lease provision or
usage or custom to the contrary.6' This rule has been changed in many
60. E.g., Fusion Arts, Inc. v. Sampson Pub. & Distrib. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 440, 248
N.Y.S.2d 383 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1964); Stern v. Harrold, 174 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Sup. Ct.
1958).
61. Bernard v. Triangle Music Co., I Wash. 2d 41, 95 P.2d 43 (1939). "The
law seems well settled that, in the absence of an agreement to pay rent in advance,
rent is payable at the end of each rental period." Id. at 53, 95 P.2d at 48, quoting
Keene v. Zindorf, 81 Wash. 152, 163, 142 P. 484, 488 (1914); see 3A THOMPSON,
supra note 4, § 1290, at 407.
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states by statute, 2 or written lease provisions to make rent payable in
advance. In any event, the standard practice of the parties is to treat
the rent of periodic tenancies as due in advance of each period of occu-
pancy. For longer term tenants, rent is due in advance of each month
of occupancy. The Model Act adopts this position, 63 thus eliminating
any ambiguity in the common law.
(2) Apportionability of Rent.
At common law rent was generally not apportionable.
6 4 One con-
sequence was that if a deposit paid by the tenant in advance of the letting
was characterized as advance rent, any breach by the tenant, such a
failure to give advance notice of termination, would entitle the landlord
to keep the whole deposit even though he might immediately rent to
another tenant and thus not be damaged to the full extent of the de-
posit.6 5 Another consequence was that a landlord might not be
awarded any rent by a court for a rent period that was incomplete at
the time of judgment. The Model Code provides for apportionment of
rent thereby avoiding both of these consequences.66
(3) Late Payment of Rent.
At common law, unless modified by a lease provision or statute,
67
the landlord could treat the tenant's failure to pay rent on the date due as
a breach of the conditions of tenancy and have the tenant evicted on
this ground alone.68 The tenant might rely on the doctrines of waiver
or estoppel to defeat an eviction by tendering the rent afterward, if he
could show that in the past the landlord had accepted rent after the date
it was due." Landlords have sought with some success to avoid these
62. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1620 (1968), MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, §§ 8,
9 (1958).
63. MODEL CODE § 2-301(2).
64. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.44, at 465 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
65. But see Heyman v. Lindwood Park, Inc., 41 NJ. Super. 437, 125 A.2d 345
(App. Div. 1956).
66. MODEL CODE § 2-301(a).
67. 2 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.44, at 465 (A.J. Casner Ed. 1952).
68. At common law the tenant's failure to pay rent did not give the landlord a
right to terminate the tenancy absent a provision in a written lease. This consequence
of the doctrine of lease law, that the rent covenant is independent of other obliga-
tions of the parties, was unworkable and has been overturned by statutes in many
states. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 535.070 (1953).
69. Duncan v. Malcomb, 234 Ark. 146, 351 S.W.2d 419 (1961). The code
provision on waiver by the landlord of his right to terminate is limited to the landlord's
conduct after a failure to pay rent and would presumably exclude consideration of
prior acceptance of late rent. See MODEL CODE § 2-313.
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doctrines by lease provisions to the effect that by acceptance of late rent,
the landlord does not waive the right to insist on future rent being
paid on time.
Statutes in many jurisdictions now provide for a short grace period
during which an action for recovery of possession is barred if the tenant
tenders rent.70  The Code adopts such a rule, suggesting a grace period
of 10 days after notice in writing informing the tenant of his right to
make a late payment and stating that if default continues thereafter, the
rental agreement will be terminated. 7 1 In some jurisdictions, the grace
period is longer, so that if after the proceeding has begun, the tenant
tenders all rent then due plus court costs to the landlord prior to final
judgment, the landlord's action for rent is abated. 72  The Model Act
provides for a stay of proceedings after judgment against the tenant
upon payment or assurance of payment within 10 days of rent due,
plus court costs, provided the default arose out of a good faith dispute
in which the tenant might have believed that he had a valid defense to
payment.73 This is probably a good compromise; while it may encour-
age tenants to manufacture justifications and imaginary defenses, it does
not require landlords to bring successive proceedings to collect rent from
late paying long-term tenants.
7 4
(4) Relation of Covenant to Repair and Covenant to Pay Rent
(a) Background
The relationship between the tenant's duty to pay rent and the
landlord's statutory duty to repair the premises has evoked consider-
70. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-18-8 (1957).
71. MODEL CODE § 2-302(1). The code rule, while exercising compassion for
the late-iaying tenant, permits the tenant who has no intention of paying rent to stay
in possession rent-free for 10 days before proceedings can be started against him. A
judgment for rent for this extra period is normally uncollectible.
72. Such is the rule in New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-55 (1952). See
Saveriano v. Saracco, 97 N.J. Super. 43, 235 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1967). In New York
the tenant is given five days after the judgment in which to pay the rent judgment and
costs before the warrant of eviction is issued. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS & PROC.
LAW § 732(2) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70). See also CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1174.
73. MODEL CODE § 3-216.
74. An example of this type of abuse by a tenant is found in Adler v. Kleinert,
55 Misc. 2d 494, 286 N.Y.S.2d 45 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967), where the landlord was
forced to bring eight proceedings against his tenant, each of which was dismissed
by a payment under New York rules after the judgment. In finally evicting the tenant,
the court was forced to employ a basis for eviction other than default in rent.
Fortunately, the possibilities of this kind of abuse are limited to long-term tenants. In
the case above, the tenant was protected from termination by rent control regula-
tions. A short-term periodic tenant who employs such tactics could be evicted under
the alternate grounds of termination of tenancy.
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able discussion in the literature and will be only briefly summarized
here. At common law, the landlord has no duty to place residential
premises in "habitable" condition 75 or to repair the leased premises
thereafter.76 Even if the landlord assumed an obligation to repair by
express covenant, the tenant's duty to pay rent is considered indepen-
dent of the landlord's obligation to make repairs.77  While the ten-
ant can collect damages for breach of the landlord's duty to repair,
he cannot defend a suit for eviction on the ground that rent is not owed
because of the landlord's breach of covenant. 78  The fact that the
landlord's duty to repair may stem from public law, rather than a
covenant, does not strengthen the tenant's defense. 70 While it is true
that if the conditions needing repair are serious enough, the tenant can
abandon possession and not be held liable for rent under the doctrine
of constructive eviction," this rule is of little practical significance to
short-term tenants and, in any event, is no defense to an eviction.
75. See Cohen v. Home Title Ins. Co., 2 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1938). There
is authority that a contrary rule exists for furnished premises under a short-term ten-
ancy. See Blawie, Implied Warranty of Fitness for Habitation of Furnished Premises
for a Short Period of Time, 33 CONN BJ. 55 (1959). However, two recent cases
have held that such a duty exists. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d
409 (1961); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. Ct. 1968).
In the latter case it was held that since District housing regulations expressly forbade
the leasing of noncomplying premises, the contract of rental was "illegal" and the
landlord was not entitled to rent thereunder. Brown was noted in 56 GEo. L.J. 920
(1968); 66 MicH. L. REv. 1753 (1968); 30 U. PA. L. REv. 134 (1968).
76. While courts may be willing to conclude that the existence of a public
law obligation under housing codes to repair premises after commencement of tenancy
will create a private law right in the tenant to sue or counterclaim for damages, there
seems to be no precedent on this precise point.
77. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 34-18-8 (1957).
78. It is often said that the rule can only be explained as a historical accident
and that as an anachronism, it should be abolished as unsuited to modern problems.
The general contract doctrine that promises by each party are presumed to be mu-
tually dependent was a development of the last two centuries, whereas the position that
the rent covenant is independent of other covenants was "known to Lord Coke," in
Holmes' famous phrase. Granting the early origins of the rule, the significant ques-
tion is why it was not changed a century ago. This rule was interpreted to prevent
the landlord from ejecting a tenant who had defaulted in the rent, but that conse-
quence was abolished by statute. See note 68 & accompanying text supra. Why have
the courts not changed the rule where it is the landlord who is in breach? Whatever
the history of the rule, there are significant modern policy reasons for its present
vitality as the following text attempts to explain.
79. The same court that decided Brown v. Southall later refused to permit the
tenant to remain in possession without liability for rent because of the landlord's failure
to repair as required by housing regulations. Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Co., 245
A.2d 836 (D.C. App. Ct. 1968).
80. See generally, Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of Constructive Eviction in the
United States, 1 DEPAuL L. REv. 69 (1951); Rapacz, Theories of Defense When
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(b) Policy Justification for Common Law Rules
Courts have not been willing to permit tenants to remain in
possession of the premises rent free merely because the landlord has
failed to discharge his duty to repair," nor have they been willing to
take on the burden of spot rent regulation by reducing the rent pro
tanto as compensation for the landlord's failure to repair.12  If' this
were the rule, as some advocates urge,83 a substantial proportion of
eviction suits would become complicated by fact-dominated squabbles
about the proper devaluation to be assessed. The following questions
would undoubtedly arise: Do the conditions alleged by the tenant really
exist;84 if so, when did they come about; who was legally responsible for
the creation of the conditions;8 5 who promised what in regard to their
repair; how much should be deducted from the rent. If even a small
deduction could be charged to the landlord, presumably the eviction
suit would fail and the tenant would be entitled to pay a lower rent
until the conditions complained of were repaired and the original rent
level restored. Only tenants under long-term leases would be bene-
fited by this rule unless the doctrine against retaliatory eviction 6 was
extended to protect short-term tenants attempting to invoke the rule.
If courts were obliged to take on these messy disputes in the volume
that they would probably appear, the present court system would be
swamped. 7 Such a rule would give the law of evictions and discrimina-
tory rent increases a rigidity bordering on rent control.
Tenants Abandon the Preinises Because of the Conditions Thereof, 4 DEPAUL L. REV.
173 (1954); Comment, Constructive Eviction of Tenants, 13 BAYLOR L. REv. 62
(1961).
81. See Lipkin v. Burnstine, 18 Ill. App. 2d 509, 152 N.E.2d 745 (1958).
82. See Siegel v. National Bead & Stone Co., 37 Misc. 2d 897, 237 N.Y.S.2d 198
(N.Y. City Ct. 1963).
83. See Emergency Business Space Rent Control Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, ch.
447, § 7(b), at 571.
84. This is one question that may be answerable without requiring the time and
expense of the court, as the housing code enforcement agency can act as an inde-
pendent fact finder. In fact, most of the burden of the problem could be placed
on that agency, which could draw up a list of serious violations. If the condition
complained of appeared on the list, rent could be abated until the repair were made.
If it did not appear, the tenant's duty to pay rent would not be affected. The rent with-
holding statutes cited note 115 infra are of this type. It is the existence of housing
codes and code enforcement agencies that for the first time makes feasible even a crude
modification of the "independent covenants" rule.
85. Cf. Caravetto v. Springfield, 54 Misc. 2d 759, 283 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Suff.
County Dist. Ct. 1967).
86. See note 146 infra.
87. Even without such a rule, it is clear that there must be a rapid expansion of
the public budget for the landlord-tenant courts simply to keep pace with the rapidly
growing level of contested litigation under present law.
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A theoretically attractive alternative to such a miasma would be to
let the market determine the value of the premises. If the tenant were
unhappy with the condition, he could move. Since the premises would
be worth less than the rent charged, the landlord theoretically would
be unable to obtain the same rent unless he made the necessary repairs.
Meanwhile, the former tenant could spend the same rent money on
premises of presumably better quality than those he left. And, since
turnover is costly to the landlord, it could reasonably be anticipated that
the landlord would make the repairs to avoid losing the tenant.
The urban rental housing market, however, especially in the low-
rent sector where problems are made more acute by racial segrega-
tion, is today a seller's market. The vacancy rate is lower than at any
time in the last decade. While there is insufficient evidence that a na-
tional housing shortage exists even in the rental sector, it is clear that
there is a shortage of quality low-rent housing (nonsubstandard as de-
fined by housing codes). 8  Under these circumstances, the hypo-
thetical landlord may be able to re-rent at the same rent level without
making more than the barest essential repairs, and the hypothetical for-
mer tenant may find that the same amount of rent will not purchase
better quality premises than those he left.
Politicans may pass laws in an attempt to prevent landlords from
taking advantage of present economic conditions, and administrators will
at least give lip service to such legislation. Legislators may even adopt
laws that would result in wholesale forfeiture of investments by a size-
able proportion of real estate investors.89 Politicans and administrators,
however, know that the law of supply and demand cannot be com-
pletely nullified. The great need is to increase the supply and quality
of low-cost rental units, and this requires investment in the construction
88. See generally Loshbough, Rehabilitation of Housing: Federal Programs and
Private Enterprise, 32 LAw & CoNTmap. PROB. 416 (1967).
89. There are many signs that this is already occurring among owners of
older low-rent buildings in northern cities. Many of these owners purchased in the
1950's and early 1960's and paid the inflated prices that prevailed then. Now they
wish to bail out and cannot find buyers except at low prices. Indeed in Camden, New
Jersey, the market is depressed by a large number of rental properties on the block
at tax foreclosure sales. Absent other investors, the logical purchasers are the tenants,
but they have insufficient financial status, and banks have not been willing to consider
such properties adequate security. The only alternative is the long-term installment
contract, and recently the Federal Housing Authority has been underwriting the sales of
single family dwellings in the slums, and conventional financiers have been willing to
participate on this basis. A similar bulwark in the market for older multiple dwelling
buildings must await tenant acceptance of the idea of condominiums and the expan-
sion of the Federal Housing Administration into that field.
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of new units. Only a small proportion of this investment can be ex-
pected to come directly from public funds. The great bulk must be
derived from private capital. Increasing the rights of tenants tends to
discourage private investment in new rental housing. Thus, reform leg-
islation that may seem beneficial to tenants today will probably result in
an even tighter rental housing market tomorrow, which is the apparent,
if not the root, cause of present tenant difficulties.
The current dilemma is illustrated by the situation in New York
City where there is more housing legislation of all types than anywhere
else; indeed there is so much that only experts can make sense of the
jumble. New York has had rent control over a substantial portion of
apartments since World War II,90 and organizations there are active in
lobbying on behalf of tenants.9 Despite all this, rental housing con-
ditions there are probably worse than at anytime since the Depression.
Despite a variety of subsidies available, construction of all new rental
residential buildings is approaching a standstill, and rent controlled
apartment buildings are being torn down and replaced by office build-
ings, which are a better investment. The major effect of all this gov-
ernment activity paradoxically has been to increase tenant frustration
and demands for yet more regulation. 2
The debate about tenants' rights to date has not centered on the
desirability of procedural law reforms as such, although it seems gen-
erally recognized that reform in this field is long overdue. Also, dis-
cussion, so far, has skirted the issue of rent control.93 The focus of
the controversy has been the question of tenant remedies for inadequate
maintenance, repairs, and services.
(c) The Model Code Compromise
Whatever the merits of the long-term economic issues involved, in-
creasing political pressure for immediate reform cannot be ignored.
The problem is to find a compromise that will give tenants some meas-
ure of satisfaction while not frightening away potential capital investors.
The relevant Model Code provisions on this matter constitute a signifi-
90. See Emergency Housing Rent Control Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1946, ch. 274,
§ 1(2). This act has continued in force via legislative extensions. E.g., N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1969, ch. 480.
91. See note 92 infra.
92. In 1968 the Metropolitan Council on Housing, a tenant-dominated lobby,
fought unsuccessfully to extend rent control to all apartments in the city.
93. Tenant restiveness concerning rapid escalation of rent in the past 2 years
in at least several urban areas threatens to put this matter back on the agenda after
two decades of quiescence.
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cant shift from the common law in the direction of protecting the tenant's
interests, but they fall considerably short of the remedies urged by some
tenant advocates or even by present statutes in some states.
9 4
First, the landlord is placed under an express obligation to the
tenant to comply with housing codes and to make all repairs necessary
to keep the premises in as good condition as they were, or ought to
have been, at the commencement of the tenancy.9" In addition, there
are specific provisions dealing with the duty of the landlord to keep
the buildings and grounds clean and sanitary, to provide garbage re-
ceptacles and to maintain all electrical, plumbing, and other facilities
in good working order.96 If the landlord fails to perform these duties
at the beginning of the tenancy, the tenant is authorized to terminate
without liability before entering possession, or having entered, to vacate
during the first week of occupancy.
97
For a failure to repair conditions that arise after the beginning
of the tenancy, two remedies are available to the tenant. If the ad-
verse effects of the conditions are serious enough, the tenant can termi-
nate without liability for future rent and vacate the premises, under a
liberalized restatement of the doctrine of constructive eviction.98 If
the condition was caused wilfully or negligently by the landlord, the
tenant may also recover damages, including reasonable expenditures
to obtain substitute housing.99 Alternatively, the tenant can remain in
possession, continue to pay rent, and sue for damages for the diminu-
tion of the value of the premises caused by the landlord's breach.'
94. Sce MODEL CODE § 2-201 to -208.
95. Id. § 2-203.
96. Id. Many communities in the South and Midwest do not have housing codes.
Further, most codes are limited in application to multiple dwelling buildings of three or
more rental units. To cover these gaps, the Model Code contains some minimum
standards found in all housing codes. As a result, the standards of a landlord's duty to
maintain the premises under the Code will normally be higher in an apartment house
than in a duplex or a row house.
97. Id. § 2-204.
98. Id. § 2-205.
99. Id. § 2-205(2). Deliberate termination of utility services and other types
of harassment have occasionally been employed as a weapon by landlords against a rent
strike to persuade tenants, or some of them, to move, where tenants have managed to
stall the eviction proceedings in the courts. This Code provision could be used to
obtain substantial damages if the landlord is successful in this tactic. There is nothing
in the Code, however, to express clearly the tenant's right to obtain injunctive relief in
the case of deliberate harassment by the landlord.
100. Section 2-102(2) provides: "Material promises, agreements, covenants and
undertakings of any kind to be performed by either party . . . shall be interpreted as
mutual and dependent conditions to the performance . . . by the other party." A
material failure of compliance with a housing code is a breach of the landlord's duty
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Except for the doctrine of constructive eviction, the tenant rem-
edies proposed by the Model Code did not exist at common law, at
least in the absence of an enforceable covenant by the landlord. 1'
Nevertheless, the common law rule that the duty to pay rent is inde-
pendent of the landlord's duty to repair is so far unaffected. 10 2  How-
ever, the Code does reserve mutuality of obligation by both landlord
and tenant for specific situations. One such situation is where, after
demand for repair and notification to the landlord, the tenant is entitled
to make the repairs himself up to a specified amount of cost, sug-
gested as $50, and deduct this from the rent.1
03
The other situations in which the landlord's breach will effect the
tenant's obligation to pay rent under the Model Code occur where the
landlord fails to supply services."0 4 Upon failure of the landlord to sup-
ply hot water to an apartment tenant, the tenant can deduct a portion of
the rent0 5 for the period of such lack of supply. In the case of a failure
to supply a reasonable amount of water or, during the cold months, of
heat, a stronger remedy is provided: The tenant can "procure sub-
stitute housing for as long as heat or water is not supplied, during which
time the rent shall abate and the landlord shall be liable for any addi-
tional expense incurred by the tenant, up to [one-half] the amount of
the abated rent."'' 00
Besides these remedies, the tenant, upon notice to the landlord,
can immediately terminate the rental agreement and recover any rent
paid in advance.' 0 If a rent reduction is sought because of a lack
of hot water or a charge for substitute housing is demanded because of
which gives rise to an action for damages, but it is not a breach of a "promise" which
would permit withholding of rent. If, however, the landlord orally promises a periodic
tenant to make a particular repair, the breach of this promise would affect the tenant's
duty to pay rent, provided the landlord's promise was supported by consideration; e.g.,
the tenant agreeing, in reliance on the promise to repair, to rerent for another term.
An eviction by the landlord based on a notice to quit, if motivated by a desire to punish
the tenant for exercising his limited right of rent withholding, would be barred by the
retaliatory eviction section. See note 151 infra.
101. See 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 86, at 556-74
(1910).
102. See Lipkin v. Burnstine, 18 I1. App. 2d 509, 152 N.E.2d 745 (1958).
103. MODEL CODE § 2-206. This provision is based on a similar, though less
restrictive, provision in the California code. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942. This remedy is
also available in the other western states that have adopted the California legislation.
MONT. REa. CODEs ANN. § 42-202 (1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 32 (1954).
104. MODEL CODE § 2-207.
105. The drafters suggest one fourth. Id.
106. Id. § 2-207(2)(b).
107. Id.
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a lack of hot water or heat, the landlord is not liable if he can show
"impossibility of performance." '  The meaning of this qualification
in various circumstances is questionable, and some explanation should
be provided.
For major repairs to older buildings, the Code adopts an elaborate
version of the technique by which a receiver is appointed to manage
the building, 00 collect the rent, borrow money for repairs," 0 and apply
net income to the repayment of the loan."' After appointment of a
receiver, if the landlord does not post adequate security, the tenant is
no longer required to pay rent to the landlord, but instead must pay it
to the receiver." 2  Receivership legislation is already in force in
New York"3 and Illinois," 4 although it is not as sophisticated as that
proposed by the Model Code.
108. Id. § 3-306(1). The remedies proposed by the Code are most valuable to
long-term tenants, but are made feasible for employment by short-term periodic tenants
by the Code's provision on retaliatory evictions, which for six months prevents the
landlord from retaliating against the tenant's use of his rights by terminating the
tenancy. See note 151 infra.
109. Id. 99 3-301 to -307.
110. Section 3-306(2)(b) provides that the notes issued by the receiver "shall be
superior to all prior assignments of rent and all prior and existing liens and encum-
brances except taxes and assessments .... ." The effect of this provision is that
holders of existing mortgages will be displaced, and the interest and amortization on
such debts will not be paid until the receiver is discharged. If the mortgagee fore-
closes, this will merely wipe out the interest of the owner of the building but will not
affect the receivership. A case 30 years ago held such a provision invalid on con-
stitutional grounds. Central Savings Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 18
N.E.2d 151 (1938). However, a more recent case held that such a law was valid.
In re Department of Bldgs. [Philco Realty], 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432 (1964).
Where major rehabilitation of a building is involved, current net rents after payments
on a mortgage are insufficient to meet expenses and a lien priority is necessary to
borrow repair money from conventional lenders.
111. MODEL CODE § 3-306(1).
112. Id. H9 3-304 to -306.
113. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw § 309(1)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70) (au-
thorizing tenant initiation of the petition for receivership after verification of conditions
by public agency).
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) (authorizing mu-
nicipal initiation of proceeding). Five other states have this type of receivership legis-
lation, but these statutes have not been used to date because they contain no provision
that the receiver's note will be secured by a prior lien on the realty, see note 110
supra, and in most of the states the municipality must initiate the proceedings. CoNN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 19-347 (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6144 (Bums 1963);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 127H (Supp. 1969) (permits tenant initiation);
Mimi. CoMp. LAws § 125.535 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2.12h (Supp.
1969). For a comparison of the standards of present legislation on which a receivership
can be authorized by a court see Wool, Initiation of Receivership Proceedings in Housing
Code Enforcement, URBAN L. ANNUAL 157 (1968). The provisions of the Model Code
are considerably more specific than those cmployed in present legislation. There seems
(d) Rent Withholding and Rent Strikes
Other than the situations specified above of failure to supply water
and heat, the Code does not authorize rent withholding. Five juris-
dictions 15 presently have statutes permitting the tenant to withhold rent
where there has been serious noncompliance with housing code stand-
ards. The significance of such legislation is that it may give a limited
protection to the phenomenon known as the rent strike,1 ' although only
the New York statute is expressly geared to this function. 17  A rent
strike is the concerted withholding of rent by a group of tenants from
the same landlord, for the purpose of exerting economic, social and
political leverage to compel him to bargain with the tenant group about
maintenance, repairs, improvements or other matters. The total num-
ber of rent strikes is still quite small in comparison with the publicity they
receive."' Nevertheless, the use of such tactics by tenants is definitely
little chance that a court would appoint a receiver for this function on the basis of gen-
eral equity power without legislative authorization. See City of St. Louis v. Golden
Gate Corp., 421 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1967) (municipal ordinance authorizing receivership
held invalid in absence of state enabling legislation).
115. New York: N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS & PROC. LAW art. 7A (McKinney
Supp. 1969). Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1969); see
Clough, Pennsylvania's Rent Withholding Law, 73 DICK. L. REv. 583 (1969); Com-
ment, Substandard Housing: The New Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act as a Solu-
tion, 5 DUQUESNE L. REv. 413 (1967); Comment, Rent Abatement Legislation: An
Answer to Landlords, 12 VILL. L. REv. 631 (1967). Massachusetts: MASS ANN. LAWS
ch. 239, § 8A (rent withholding), ch. Ill, § 127F (Supp. 1969) (rent escrow). See
generally Angevine & Taube, Enforcement of Public Health Laws, 52 MAss. L.Q. 205
(1967). Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.530(3) (Supp. 1969). Maryland:
See BALTIMORE, MD., CODE PUB. Loc. LAWS § 459A (1968), added by Law of July 1,
1968, ch. 459, § 1, [1968] Md. Laws 832.
116. For a good general discussion of rent strikes, see Comment, Tenant Unions:
Collective Bargaining and the Low-Income Tenant, 77 YALE L.J. 1368 (1968).
117. The operation of the New York procedure is remarkably similar to a receiver-
ship, but without some of the advantages of a receivership. An excellent field study of
authorized collective rent withholding under the New York statute during the first two
years after its passage is Comment, Tenant Rent Strikes, 3 COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc.
PROB. 1, (1967).
118. In 1968 there were numerous instances of collective activities by tenants.
All of these instances may not have involved rent withholding.
Accurate information regarding the actual outcome of the many rent strikes
that have begun recently is difficult to acquire. In the past, however, a sizeable frac-
tion of the rent strikes which have been reported "successful" have involved public
housing authorities. This is not surprising, because administrators of these projects
tend to be more sensitive to public criticism than private owners. They are also glad
to make expenditures for repairs and improvements and can use a tenant strike as lev-
erage to acquire an increased budget for this purpose. And, unlike private owners,
public administrators do not have to spend their own money or worry about private
profits. On the other hand, local public sentiment can run strongly against a rent
strike by tenants who are already receiving a public subsidy, and this can cause local
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on the increase."19
The sociology of this phenomenon is interesting. A significant
proportion of the rent strikes have occurred in medium- and high-rent
housing complexes, where the problems are less likely to be compliance
with basic housing code standards than rent increases and failures to
provide desired improvements. 20 Rent strikes in deteriorated housing
seldom occur spontaneously, as they do in higher rent buildings; the
organization of low-income tenants usually requires substantial efforts
by outsiders.1
21
The main deterrent to rent strikes is the right of the landlord to
evict or terminate at the end of the tenancy period for failure to pay
rent. Rent withholding legislation, where it exists, has played a
definite but limited role in protecting striking tenants from eviction.'23
Where no protective legislation exists, attorneys for the strikers try to
delay final judgment on eviction until the landlord succumbs to the ten-
ants' pressures. 24 Even where the landlord's right to evict is clear, it is
officialdom to stiffen its stance against tenant demands. This reaction was indicated
in a rent strike in public housing in St. Louis, which was settled recently after nine
months of dispute.
119. See generally Comment, supra note 116.
120. "Experience is too recent to be conclusive, but thus far the reported in-
stances demonstrate the use of tenant self-help remedies [i.e., the rent strike] by
good middle-class tenants seeking to compel the extension of housing amenities, if
not frills, rather than the repair of dangerous conditions." Gribetz & Grad, Housing
Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLuM. L. REv. 1254, 1289 (1966).
These authors cite as examples the two rent strike cases in New York which had been
reported at that time. De Koven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266
N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. City Ct. 1965); Himmel v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 47 Misc. 2d
93, 262 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. City Ct. 1965). The present author's observations of the
constituency of the New Jersey Tenants Coalition, a state-wide organization of tenant
councils, agrees with this estimate.
121. See Coulson, The Tenant Union-New Institution or Abrasive Failure, 14
PRAc. LAW. 23, 25 (April, 1968).
122. Id. at 25-26.
123. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. AcrlONS & PROC. LAW § 755 (McKinney Supp.
1969).
124. This can be done by various methods: Requesting a jury trial, see note 24
supra; requesting postponements due to temporary unavailability of witness, counsel
or evidence; making a tender of rent collected by the tenant union under statutory au-
thority, see note 72 supra, conditioned on compliance by the landlord with housing code
obligations and requesting delay for opportunity to present a brief on the legal suf-
ficiency of the tender; claiming retaliatory eviction and asking for a delay to present a
brief; requesting a discretionary stay of execution as authorized by statute, see note 40
supra; requesting a stay of eviction of all tenants while the decision against one is
appealed, to keep down the cost of appellate bonding of the type referred to in note 47
supra; and making a lengthy appeal. Judges, caught in the crossfire of a public con-
troversy, have in some instances been only too happy to delay decision in the hope
that the parties will resolve their difficulties and avoid the necessity of judgment.
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estimated that only a very small proportion of striking tenants have
actually been evicted. Generally after a month or so both sides retreat
from their initial postures of belligerency and get down to the terms of
settlement.
125
B. Violation of Rules
In addition to default in rent, other bases for eviction, such as wil-
ful damage to the premises or serious disturbance to other tenants, are
established by statute or case law in many jurisdictions. 126  But even
in these states, the law is often sufficiently vague that the landlord will
rely on a written lease that incorporates a list of more detailed rules
of tenancy and gives the landlord the option to terminate the tenancy
for continuous violation of such rules. 27 Eviction proceedings based
on such a cause of action are infrequent and are significant only in
connection with long-term leases since the landlord can evict a short-
term periodic tenant for these reasons simply by terminating the ten-
ancy at the end of a period after giving appropriate advance notice.
128
One reason eviction for violation of written rules is not often em-
ployed is the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory evidence of such vio-
lations. Other tenants are frequently the best witnesses to these facts
but are often unwilling to testify or even sign affidavits accusing the
offending tenant of rules violations.
The provisions of the Model Code on regulations drafted by the
landlord provide a valuable service in suggesting a set of principles that
would help to define this vague area of landlord-tenant law. They are
intended to protect tenants from vague, arbitrary, whimsical, uncon-
sented to, unpopular and unequally enforced rules. 20 It provides that
every rule must have a legitimate purpose in protecting the landlord or
the tenants in general that is reasonably related to such purpose, is ex-
plicit, and applies to all tenants in a fair manner." °  Such regulations
125. For extensive rehabilitation of older buildings, the technique of receivership
while more drastic than a rent strike, is considerably better adapted to effect necessary
repairs, even though this remedy, especially as it is defined in the Model Code, is
restricted in the type of buildings to which it is applicable, MODEL CODE § § 1-206,
3-301, and may be less appealing to politically active tenants than the rent strike. Con-
sider the narrative of Attorney Glotta in Glotta, The Radical Lawyer and the Dy-
namics of a Rent Strike, 26 GUILD PRACT. 132 (1967).
126. Joyce Prop., Inc. v. Rubi, 52 Misc. 2d 825, 277 N.Y.S.2d 18 (N.Y. City Ct.
1965).
127. Diehl v. Gibbs, 173 So. 2d 719 (Fla. App. 1965).
128. Davis v. Broughton, 369 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1963).
129. See MODEL CODE § 2-311.
130. Id. § 2-311(2)(c).
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must be brought to the attention of the tenant at the time of the agree-
men to rent, or if later, they must be consented to in writing if they
"work a substantial modification of his bargain.'*' In addition, the
landlord must give the tenant written notice and a five day grace period
to cease violation. 32 If the violation is continued or renewed thereafter,
the landlord will be deemed to have waived his rights by accepting
rent 83 or failing to sue for eviction within a specified period, suggested
as 30 days.'
C. Expiration of Long-Term Leases and Termination
of Short-Term Periodic Tenancies
(1) Expiration of Long-Term Leases
Many residential tenancies are for relatively long periods. Here,
as in the case of short-term leases, the tenant is subject to eviction if he
holds over after expiration of the term. The question3 5 of termination
with the expiration of the original agreed to period, however, may be
complicated by the landlord's continued acceptance of rent, for this may
manifest an intention to continue the tenancy. The resultant relation-
ship has been deemed a periodic tenancy by operation of law.13' The
length of those periods varies with the facts of the cases and the juris-
dictions in which they are decided, although in most states the period is
the interval between rent periods, normally one month. The Model Code
adopts the position that the resulting periodic tenancy is month-to-
month. 117  The expiration of some long-term leases are qualified by
provisions in the lease for automatic renewal upon sufficient advance
notification by the tenant, and such provisions may be subject to some
131. Id. § 2-311(1)(b).
132. Id. § 2-312(1).
133. Id. § 2-313.
134. Id. § 2-312(2).
135. At the expiration of a fixed-term lease, the tenant is not normally entitled to
a notice of termination. Many long-term leases, however, have a provision for auto-
matic renewal unless one of the parties notifies the other of an intention to terminate
a substantial period in advance.
The status of the former tenant after expiration or termination of the relationship
was characterized at common law as a tenant at sufferance. See Note, The Tenant at
Sufferance in Massachusetts, 44 B.U.L. REv. 213 (1964).
136. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.35, at 226 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
R. POWE.LL & P. ROHAN, POwELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 254, at 180 (abr. ed. 1968).
The Code modifies the usual rule by permitting the landlord to accept rent for one
month after the termination without being bound to treat the tenant as a periodic
tenant. Acceptance of rent after one month from termination is presumed to have this
consequence. MODEL CODE § 2-310(3).
137. MODEL CODE § 2-310(3).
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public policy limitations.18
(2) Termination of Periodic Tenancies
(a) The Law in General
Probably the majority of residential tenancies are for short terms.
The term is usually month-to-month, or in some situations with fur-
nished premises and in boarding houses, week-to-week. With such ar-
rangements either party can terminate the tenancy by giving the other
proper notice at least one period in advance. The landlord to some
degree can insure the performance of this obligation by the tenant by
requiring a deposit equal to one period's rent at the beginning of the
tenancy.' 39 The tenant's protection is that some evidence of com-
pliance with this notice requirement by the landlord is necessary as a
basis for an eviction proceeding. In some jurisdictions, the notice to
quit must be in writing, while in others oral notice is sufficient.' If
the notice is in writing, some states require that it be personally served
on the tenant, while others permit it to be sent by ordinary mail or
slipped under the door of the tenant's apartment.' 4 ' The notice is re-
quired to state clearly that the tenancy is terminated; a mere statement
138. Kalicki v. Bell, 83 N.J. Super. 139, 199 A.2d 58 (App. Div. 1964) (a year
lease with an option to renew held renewable for one period only; thereafter month-
to-month); Note, Specific Performance: Enforceability of Option to Renew Lease-
Rental Not Fixed, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 70-73 (1964).
139. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
140. H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 199 (1910).
141. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-532 (1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
39-5 (1952) (no requirement other than the notice be written); N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTIONS & PROC. LAW § 735 (McKinney Supp. 1909) (if tenant is not at home); cf.
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1162(2) (substitute service is permitted if the tenant cannot
otherwise be located). Section 2-310(1) of the Model Code does not specify that the
notice must be in writing, so presumably an oral notice is proper. Whether a local
rule requiring a written notice would continue to govern is debatable. Some thought
might be given to this matter. Two reasons why a notice of termination should not be
required to be in writing are (1) that in these frequently informal arrangements
there would often be an unwitting failure to satisfy such a requirement, and (2) that
probably tenants would fail to comply more often than landlords. While requiring a
written notice of termination would cut down substantially on factual disputes about
when or if such a notice was given, it would operate adversely to the tenant more
often than to the landlord. There remains the possibility of a double standard by
which the landlord's notice to quit could be required to be in writing but the tenant's
notice could be oral. This might be justified on the ground of the landlord's pre-
sumably greater familiarity with legal requirements and employment of more business-
like practices. In order to justify this presumption, the rule might be limited to
landlords of an "apartment building" as defined in the Model Code as then such a
rule would more closely approximate present practice, as a high proportion of landlords
with a number of rental units do use written notices. MODEL CODE § 1-206.
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Traditionally there was no defense to the landlord's eviction pro-
ceeding based on a termination of a periodic tenancy if the notice to
quit, followed by a demand for possession, and the summons and com-
plaint were properly served on the tenant. 143  The tenant's right to
possession was based on a relation that had been terminated; from the
time of termination the landlord had an absolute right to recover posses-
sion.144 There have been exceptions to this rule, as when, during the
world wars, rent controls were in force in many cities. In New York
City such controls remain applicable to a large, though declining, num-
ber of apartment units.
45
One new limitation that has emerged is the defense against re-
taliatory eviction, 4G that is, an eviction where the landlord's motive for
terminating is to punish the tenant for conduct that the tenant was en-
titled to perform, such as complaining to a housing code enforcement
agency concerning substandard conditions on the premises. To date, the
defense of retaliatory eviction has been allowed in two jurisdictions by
case law 47 and in two others by statute' 4 and seems destined for wide-
142. A notice to the tenant that as of the next period he must pay a higher rent
has been held not satisfactory as a notice to quit. Skyline Gardens, Inc. v. McGarry,
22 N.J. Super. 193, 91 A.2d 621 (App. Div. 1952) (tenant held entitled to remain in
possession under old rent until served with a proper notice to quit). If the notice states
definitely that the tenancy is terminated, an offer of a new tenancy at a higher rent
may be included as an alternative. Bhar Realty Corp. v. Becker, 49 N.J. Super. 585,
140 A.2d 756 (App. Div. 1958) (holdover tenant liable for the higher rent).
143. See Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U.S. 71 (1893). As to disputed service of proc-
ess, see note 174 infra.
144. But see H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 276 (1910).
145. See NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. Y, §§ 51-1.0 to -18.0.
146. Note, Retaliatory Eviction-Is California Lagging Behind?, 18 HAsTirNs L.J.
700 (1967); Comment, Protection for Citizen Complaints to Public Authorities-Pro-
hibition of Retaliatory Evictions, 48 NEB. L. REv. 1101 (1969); Note, Landlord and
Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs---CIv. Lm. L. REv. 193 (1967);
Note, Retaliatory Evictions-Month-to-Month Tenant Who Reported Housing Code
Violations Held Entitled to Raise Defense of Landlord's ]Retaliatory Notice in Evic-
tion Action, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 410 (1969).
147. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968). This decision, applicable
only to the District of Columbia, held that the Summary Eviction Act of the District
should be interpreted to exclude retaliatory evictions, because such evictions would frus-
trate the enforcement of, and undercut the policy behind, the District's regulations re-
lating to housing standards.
There are several cases presently being litigated in New York regarding the
propriety of retaliatory evictions, but at least two decided cases state that the tenant
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spread adoption in one form or another. 4 9 The Model Code proposes
a very elaborate version of the defense, which extends beyond complaints
made to government agencies 5 to the protection of tenants who utilize
the statutory remedies provided by the Model Code for repair cost de-
ductions and failure of utility services.' 5'
(c) Termination in Public Housing
A far more important limitation on evictions based on termination
of periodic tenancies is represented by a recent rule that a tenant cannot
be evicted from government operated housing without cause.' 52 This
has a defense in such a situation. Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1096, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278
(Bing. City Ct. 1968) (tenant has an "equitable" defense); Tarver v. G. & C. Const.
Corp., 64 Civ. 2945 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 9, 1964), edited and reprinted in G. GIBBONS,
MATERIALS ON LANDLORD-TENANT AND THE POOR 72 (Aug. 1969) (in University of
Pennsylvania Law Library) (retaliatory eviction is an unconstitutional interference with
tenant's rights to petition government for redress of grievances).
148. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5646 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-92
(Supp. 1969) (declaring retaliatory eviction, as defined by the act, to be a disorderly
persons offense). As a result of this statute, one lower court has held that a termina-
tion of a periodic tenancy based on a retaliatory motive constitutes a defense to any
subsequent eviction proceedings. Alexander Hamilton Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Whaley,
107 N.J. Super. 89, 257 A.2d 7 (Hudson County Dist. Ct., 1969).
149. The main argument to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Edwards
v. Habib, was that such conduct by the landlord constituted unreasonable interfer-
ence with the tenant's constitutionally protected first amendment rights of freedom of
speech and petition. The court concluded that this theory was based on the doctrine
of Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), that judicial enforcement of a private,
racially restricted covenant constitutes state action and is violative of the fourteenth
amendment. After a long discussion, the court declined to decide the case on this
basis. If the court had adopted this rationale, presumably the decision would have
had the force of authority throughout the nation. As matters now stand, each
state court can accept or reject the rule. The court dodged the question whether the
District's summary eviction legislation would be constitutional as applied to this situa-
tion. Arguably, the hazy theories and dangerous precedents associated with the
Shelley v. Kramer doctrine are not applicable where the constitutionality of a state
statute is involved.
150. MODEL CODE § 2-407. This protects the tenant for a period of six months
from eviction by termination of the relation or by discriminatory rent increases for
making a housing code complaint or utilizing the remedies of the Code regarding re-
pairs. However, it does not protect tenants involved in organizing a tenant union prior
to a housing code complaint. If rent withholding is commenced, eviction based on
termination by notice may be proper, for the landlord's motive can now be shown not to
be to punish the tenant but to clear the apartment for a tenant who will pay rent.
The Code provides that the defense to eviction is inapplicable if the premises, on the
day of filing the complaint, are in compliance with the housing code. MODEL CODE
§ 2-407(2)(f). This rule is desirable in order to keep the tenant from abusing his
rights by making frivolous complaints in order to delay an eviction based on an immi-
nent termination.
151. See notes 103-04 supra.
152. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
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rule applies to several million people living in public housing projects
operated by local housing authorities and subsidized in large part by
the federal government. The position previously recognized had been
that the government as landlord could not act unreasonably toward its
tenants and therefore could not evict tenants for improper reasons. 153
However, an eviction based on a termination of a periodic tenancy, which
is apparently the tenure of almost all public housing tenants, did not re-
quire any explanation.
This state of the law was changed recently by the Supreme Court.
In the case of Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 54 the Court held that
termination of a public housing tenancy required a prior informal hear-
ing at which the tenant must be informed of the reasons for termina-
tion. The reasons given can then be disputed both on the facts and
their legal sufficiency. This new position augurs a relatively rapid de-
velopment, mostly by federal courts, of a national body of law on the
form and scope of the required hearing and the reasonableness of the
cause of termination. As to the latter, numerous issues have already
received attention, among them birth of illegitimate children, cohabita-
tion by unmarried parties and conviction of members of the tenant's
family for crimes. 55
(d) Double Rent for Overstaying
Many jurisdictions have statutes which provide that, if a tenant re-
mains in possession after the lease is terminated and fails to move after
demand by the landlord for possession, he shall be liable for rent at
double the rate of the previous rental agreement.' 56 Generally the
courts, where possible, have attempted to avoid application of the
statute by construing it strictly and finding waivers by landlords.
5 7
153. See Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
154. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
155. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HousING: A CENTURY
OF FRUSTRATION 126-144 (1968); Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants-A Sur-
vey of the Developing Law, 1969 DuKE L.J. 399-474; Comment, Nonfinancial Eligibil-
ity and Eviction Standards in Public Housing: The Problem Family in the Great
Society, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1122 (1968). Other important problems in the law re-
lating to public housing concern whether applicants can require the public housing au-
thority to promulgate written standards for admission, challenge those standards in
particular cases, acquire a status on a waiting list for apartments, or have a right to a
court order compelling the authority to admit them to occupancy.
156. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-6; see Peck, A Comment on Damages in
Unlawful Detainer Actions in Washington, 37 WASH. L. REV. 451 (1962).
157. See United States v. Beatty, 88 F. Supp. 646 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (modified
later on other grounds); Alexander v. Loeb, 230 IlM. 454, 82 N.E. 833 (1906).
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The Code permits a double rent penalty, to be apportioned to the
number of days the tenant overstays and apparently to be applied at the
court's discretion.158 However, the Code limits the effect of the penalty
to a one month period. If the tenant remains in possession longer than
one month the rate reverts to that of the previous tenancy."5 9 This pro-
vision prevents a landlord from building up rent against a solvent ten-
ant at double rates; but at the same time, it protects the landlord by
giving him one month to complete the eviction proceedings before the
penalty rate expires. This period of time may not be out of line with
the actual time required in most localities.' 60
(e) Radical Proposals to Strengthen Tenant Security
As to the landlord's remedy of termination of short-term periodic
tenancies, some advocates of low-income tenants have suggested sweep-
ing alterations of the present system in the direction of protecting the
tenure of occupants. One change that has been suggested is the abo-
lition of evictions based on termination of the tenancy, thereby applying
to the private landlord the for cause rule applicable to public housing
authorities. 6 ' A logical consequence of this change is that landlords
would be limited to rent modifications that were uniform in rate to all
units within the same building, for otherwise rent discrimination could
be employed as a substitute for termination. Landlords would find it
much more difficult to rid their buildings of destructive or disruptive
tenants both for their own economic benefit and the peace and welfare
of the other tenants. Requiring a good reason for eviction appears fair
on its face; proving such a reason could be more difficult.
The other suggestion for protecting the tenant's security is that a
minimum term of periodic tenancy be established at something like six
months. 62 Since tenants could still terminate by giving one month's
158. MODEL CODE § 2-310(3): "[I1f the tenant continues in possession of the
premises after the date of termination without the landlord's consent, such tenant shall
pay to the landlord a sum not to exceed twice the monthly rental under the previous
agreement, computed and prorated on a daily basis, for each day he remains in posses-
sion for any period up to one month. If the tenant remains in possession for a period
greater than one month, he shall be liable to the landlord for a sum equal to the av-
erage monthly rental under the previous rental agreement for each additional month
or fraction thereof." (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. A recent study in Camden County, New Jersey, disclosed that the average
time elapsing between filing a complaint and enforcement of evictions in residential
evictions was 44 days.
161. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
162. See Levi & Hablutzel, Preface to MODEL CODE 2.
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notice, such a provision would be one-sided. Nevertheless, to some
extent it would be beneficial in that it would eliminate some evictions
based on petty reasons. A minimum term of about six months is prob-
ably ample to permit the landlord to adjust his rent level to changes in
local market conditions. Other possible consequences and their evalu-
ation have not yet been analyzed.
Neither of these proposals, however, appears to have any chance
of legislative adoption in the near future. 63 The idea that security in
rental housing should be like that existing in factory employment is of
relatively recent vintage. As is the case of labor legislation, the conse-
quences could be profound both for good and ill.
I. Tenant's Right to a Hearing
A. Introduction
Another group of issues in landlord-tenant law centers around the
problem of protecting the tenant's interest in having a hearing to de-
fend his possession. While a summary dispossess proceeding obviously
entails a right to a hearing, there are methods available by which the
landlord is permitted to put the tenant out of possession without re-
course to the courts. These are the landlord's remedies of self-help
evictions and distraint; they are separately discussed in later sections
of this paper.0 4 Beyond this, there are a variety of special burdens,
techniques and impediments, some of which exist in only one or a
few jurisdictions, that render the tenant's right to a hearing on the issue
of possession practically valueless. It is the latter group of problems to
which attention is addressed in this section.
First, a word about policy. The great bulk of cases in landlord-
tenant courts involve low-income tenants holding under short-term ten-
ancies. The denial of a hearing under present landlord-tenant law is
for these people just one more example of their exclusion from the
enjoyment of rights and privileges enjoyed by the more affluent in our
society. Yet, central to our legal and social system is the idea that if
the interest being defended is of value, the defendant ought to have his
"day in court" and the opportunity to "speak his piece." Today it is
163. The Code drafters rejected these possibilities, stating in the preface, "the
Code leaves two factors in every rental arrangement to the complete discretion of the
parties-the rental price and the length of term of the rental agreement." Levi &
Hablutzel, Preface to MODEL CODE 2. The qualified disability of the landlord from
terminating a periodic tenant for six months in a situation constituting a retaliatory
eviction (see supra note 151) is not really an exception to this basic principle.
164. See text accompanying notes 186-17 infra.
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being urged as especially important to society in general that people
of low income, particularly ethnic and racial minority groups, be en-
couraged to utilize and participate in the legal system. Part of the idea
may be that by this process they will become more integrated into the
larger society. A more important reason may be that such persons
will be induced to turn to a traditional and orderly method of presenting
their grievances.
Whatever the merits of the political factors involved, the courts,
backed by the American ethos, have great faith in the belief that "fair-
ness" requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard when matters of
personal importance are being decided. A prime psychological factor
supporting this view is that if the opportunity to be heard is not utilized,
as is often the case in landlord-tenant proceedings, the tenant has only
himself to blame for his predicament.
B. The Georgia Bonding Requirement
An example of a serious limitation on the tenant's right to a hear-
ing to defend possession is found in a Georgia statute 6 5 requiring the
tenant to post a bond to protect the landlord against a loss of rent pen-
dente lite as a condition to remaining in possession until final judgment
after the hearing. Since the effect of this statute is to require the ten-
ant to pay over a year's rent in advance, the right to a hearing is
effectively denied to most residential tenants. A test of the constitution-
ality of this statute is inevitable.'66 and when this occurs the author
predicts that it will be held invalid."'
C. Confession of Judgment Provisions
Another technique employed by landlords to deny their tenants a
hearing in eviction proceedings is the use of confession of judgment pro-
visions in leases, by which the tenant appoints the landlord as his
attorney to confess judgment against the tenant for possession and rent
due in the event of a dispute. While a default rent judgment can some-
165. GA. CODE ANN. § 61-303 (1966).
166. An attempt to contest the constitutionality of the statute was unsuccessful
because the tenants were evicted by the sheriff under the statute and the Georgia Su-
preme Court refused to consider the issue because the case was moot. The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967) (Warren, C.J., and
Douglas, J., dissenting). See Note, 20 STAN. L. REV. 766 (1968).
167. Before the Supreme Court this present term is the constitutionality of the
Connecticut appeals bond requirement as it applies to indigent tenants. See note 50
supra. If that statute is held invalid, the fate of the Georgia statute, which effectively
denies any hearing to the poor, is ultimately doomed. The Georgia statute will prob-
ably be held invalid eventually, even if appeals bond requirements are upheld.
[Vol. 21
MODEL LANDLORD-TENANT CODEJanuary 1970]
times be reopened to challenge, the eviction warrant normally will
already have been executed. In many jurisdictions at least some types
of confession of judgment provisions are invalid, either by case law or by
statutes.1 68 The attack on these provisions in the context of install-
ment sale contracts is well under way, 69 but their attack in leases is
more limited, since the employment of such provisions in form leases
seems largely confined to a few jurisdictions. 170  The Model Code not
only declares them unenforceable, but makes their inclusion in the
lease a misdemeanor' 7 ' with a fine of up to $200172 and provides
that one-half of the fine is payable to the tenant whose information
results in the prosecution
17
1
D. Inadequate Service of Process
Another limitation on the right to a hearing to defend possession
has been alleged to exist in some major cities, particularly New York
City, due to the widespread failure of adequate personal service of proc-
ess on tenants. 74 Some employees of process service agencies are un-
willing, for the small fee they are paid, to take the personal risks in-
volved in serving legal papers in the slums; instead they throw them
away and sign the affidavit that they have been served.
Many states permit service of process to be made in landlord-
tenant proceedings in any of three ways. The first is personal service
on the tenant." Second, where the tenant is not at home, the sum-
mons may be left with someone else of suitable age at the address. 176
Where this procedure is used, a copy of the summons must be mailed
to the tenant also. A third method of service is permitted where the
process server finds no one at home, in which case he can affix a
copy of the summons to a conspicuous place on the premises. 77 Slip-
168. See text accompanying notes 46-51 supra.
169. See Note, A Clash in Ohio?: Cognovit Notes and the Business Ethic of the
UCC, 35 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 470 (1966).
170. The most notable state is Pennsylvania. Note, Confessions of Judgment, 102
U. PA. L. Rnv. 524 (1954); Note, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Ad-
hesioan Contract, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1197, 1209 (1963).
171. MODEL CODE § 3-404.
172. Id. § 3-501.
173. Id. § 3-502.
174. COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AssIsTANCE, DOES A VENDEE UNDER AN INSTALLMENT
SALES CONTRACT RECEIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF SUIT INSTITUTED BY A VENDOR, 23
REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 263, 264 (April, 1968); Note,
Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc. PROB. 17 (1967).




ping the papers under the door does not satisfy this requirement. Here
too, the papers must be mailed to the tenant. These three methods
have been adopted in the Model Code,178 with the qualification, noted
previously, that a default judgment for rent, as opposed to possession,
requires personal service. 79
A complete failure of any type of service occurs when the process
server does not serve the papers yet signs the return affidavit that they
were personally served on the tenant. This type of situation occurs in-
frequently, except perhaps in states where only the first two types of
service mentioned are permitted. Where it does occur the tenant may
not be informed of the proceedings until a public officer arrives to en-
force the eviction orders. The tenant may be able to reopen a default
judgment for rent on a satisfactory showing that he was not at the
premises at the time the affidavit states the summons was served. 180
But unless the tenant has a defense to the rent claim, this showing is
of little use. Meanwhile, the tenant's goods may have already been
moved out by a court officer. 8
The actual frequency of such cases is debatable. A far more
common problem exists in most jurisdictions that permit service by
posting a copy of the summons in a conspicuous place. Here the process
server may affix the papers to the tenant's door without attempting to
discover if someone is home, put them under the door rather than
affixing them to it, or may not go to the premises at all. In any event,
he signs the affidavit that he was unable to make personal service and
mails a copy of the summons instead. In none of the three situations
described is the tenant properly served, and he will be able to defeat
178. MODEL CODE § 3-206.
179. Id. § 3-213.
180. A recent example of such a case is where the tenant presented numerous
affidavits that she was elsewhere during the entire day that the sheriff's return
affidavit indicated that she had been personally served, and the deputy sheriff could
give only a vague description of the tenant. Under these facts an Illinois appellate
court reversed a judgment for possession based on the deputy sheriff's testimony of
personal service. Drexel Say. & Loan Ass'n v. McCall, 107 Ill. App. 2d 30, 245
N.E.2d 900 (1969).
181. If the tenant has some advance notice of the imminent eviction by the
public officer, there may still be time to fend off the eviction and challenge the judg-
ment on the ground of lack of service of process. An order to show cause may be
obtained from a judge and personally served on the landlord, requiring a prompt
hearing on the tenant's defense. It is said that in New York City "[a] judge will
almost always sign an Order to Show Cause. . . . If the tenant was not served with
the dispossess originally . . . it is almost always possible to vacate the final order and
have the entire proceedings dismissed." N. LE BLANC, A HANDBOOK OF LANDLORD-
TENANT PROCEDURES AND LAW, WITH FoRms 21 (2d ed. 1969).
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the action for possession if the judge is willing to believe his testimony
that the papers were never affixed to the door or left with a proper
person.
Usually only in the third situation described, where there was
never any attempt to serve process at the premises, is the tenant seriously
inconvenienced. The time gap between the date of service and the
date of hearing is normally quite short,182 and if the papers arrive by
mail several days after the service date, the tenant is deprived of valu-
able time that could have been used in preparation for the hearing. It
may be that the best solution to the problem would be to permit
service by mail without a requirement that personal service be first
attempted and compensate for the delay by adding at least 2 days to the
minimum time before the hearing.
E. Crhninal Trespass Legislation
In addition to a summary eviction proceeding, a landlord in some
jurisdictions may be able to invoke a criminal trespass prosecution
against the tenant who remains in possession after the landlord has
properly demanded such possession upon termination of the lease or de-
fault by the tenant. While under these statutes a tenant may be sub-
ject to a jail sentence as well as a fine, it seems probable that incarcera-
tion would be reserved for only the most aggravated situations. On the
other hand, jail is the alternative for inability to pay the fine. The
extent to which landlords attempt, or courts permit, the employment of
such a remedy is unknown. In at least one state, Arkansas,' a crim-
inal trespass statute providing for a fine is specifically made available
to the landlord against tenants who remain in possession 10 days after a
demand for possession when the default by the tenant is failure to pay
rent.
The penalty of a fine, if kept at low levels, may seem no more
onerous than statutes in many states providing for double rent8 4 by the
overstaying tenant. However, the fine is supplementary to the obliga-
tion to pay rent or sometimes even double rent; furthermore, the tenant
may be put in jail for inability to pay it. The ability of a landlord to
threaten criminal prosecution is a powerful inducement to the tenant to
give up possession and, to some degree, can supplant the landlord's
182. This period varies from state to state. The Code suggests a minimum of five
days and a maximum of 12 days. MODEL CODE § 3-205(1).
183. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-523 (1947). This statute was recently upheld against
constitutional challenge in Poole v. State, 244 Ark. 1222, 428 S.W.2d 628 (1968).
184. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
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need to employ summary eviction proceedings. While the tenant has an
opportunity to be heard at the criminal trial, his willingness to present
his case may be significantly inhibited because of the great risks of
failure in the criminal action. Conviction of tenants under criminal
trespass legislation may be subject to attack on constitutional
grounds.185 Surely the idea of accomplishing an eviction through crim-
inal proceedings is offensive.
IV. Self-Help Evictions
A. Background
At common law a landlord who is entitled to possession of rented
premises may put the tenant out of possession without resort to legal
process, provided he does so peacefully. 8 The reasons why a land-
lord may be tempted to utilize self-help, as opposed to his legal rem-
edy, relate to the time and expense of accomplishing his objective
through his legal remedy of summary eviction. As a result, the more
safeguards that are built into protection of the tenant's possession in
summary eviction proceedings, the greater is the landlord's incentive to
avoid the burden of legal process and evict the tenant himself. It
follows that unless the landlord's right of self-help is abolished or highly
circumscribed, efforts to strengthen the tenant's rights in summary evic-
tion proceedings may be self-defeating. A summary of the American
law of self-help evictions is indispensable if any assessment of the
possibilities of reform is to be made.
The first requirement for eviction by self-help is that, at the time
the landlord acts, he must have a clear right of possession.8 7  Other-
wise, the landlord will be liable to the tenant for trespass and possibly
for conversion of the tenant's household goods as well.
B. Eviction by Use of Force
The second requirement relates to the use of force in accomplish-
ing the eviction. Most jurisdictions have adopted the English statute
185. See note 183 supra.
186. See, e.g., Calef v. Jesswein, 93 Ind. App. 514, 176 N.E. 632 (1931); Gibbs
v. Stanfill, 146 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 1962). In California a limitation is imposed by
statute that the landlord's rights depend on a reentry provision in the lease and that
the landlord must serve three day's notice on the tenant. CAL. CIV. CODE § 791. The
employment of this statutory right has been gutted by the case of Jordan v. Talbot,
55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961).
187. See, e.g., Burford v. Krouse, 89 F. Supp. 818 (D.D.C. 1950); Krasner v.




on forcible eviction and detainer, which is a descendant of a statute
dating back to 1381.11s Originally, that act made recovery of posses-
sion by a landlord through the use of force a criminal offense. Later
it was amended to provide that, where force is used, the tenant may be
reinstated into possession.18 9  While the remedy of recovering posses-
sion may be useful to a long-term agricultural tenant, it has little prac-
tical value to the short-term periodic tenant of residential premises.
Such a tenant has already been put out of possession and has had to
move elsewhere. He has little interest in moving back to his former
apartment where he may be served immediately with a notice to quit,
effective at the end of the following month.
Although the remedy of repossession may be a dead letter to most
modem residential tenants, cases in a number of states have relied on
statutes providing this remedy to create a tort action for damages for
the tenant. 90  The reasoning of these cases is that the statutes establish
a standard that makes the use of force by a landlord wrongful, that
legislative remedy of repossession was not intended to be exclusive, and
that the wilful violation of the legislative standard should be considered
tortious. On the other hand, cases in some states hold that the remedy
of damages is not available.' The bulk of all cases on this topic are
19th century decisions and constitute a doubtful basis for predicting
what courts would do today.'92 Policy attitudes on landlord-tenant law
have changed considerably in the last several decades, 9 3 and in the light
of this changed public _amper it seems permissible to predict that al-
most all courts, even those with old precedent to the contrary, would
rule that a self-help eviction accomplished by force or threat of force is
tortious and would permit the tenant to recover for damages. 94
188. See The Forcible Entry Act of 1381, 5 Rich. 2.
189. See 3 A. THoMpsoN, supra note 16, § 1369, at 707-08.
190. Note, Forcibly Ejected Tenant-Damages, Possession, Both or None?, 28 U.
C. L. REv. 369 (1959).
191. E.g., Princess Amusement Co. v. Smith, 174 Ala. 342, 56 So. 479 (1911);
Steams v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568 (1871); Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass. 309 (1876); Smith
v. Detroit Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, 115 Mich. 340, 73 N.W. 395 (1897); Souter v. Codman,
14 R.I. 119 (1883); Bachinsky v. Federal Coal & Coke Co., 78 W. Va. 721, 90
S.E. 227 (1916).
192. Compare cases cited note 191, supra, and 194, infra.
193. There is a growing tendency, for example, to apply contract principles to
leases. 1 AMERMAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11, at 202-04 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); see
MODEL CODE § 1-401.
194. See, e.g., Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488
(1961) (property damage, storage costs); Rivers v. Tessitore, 165 So. 2d 888 (La. Ct.
App. 1964) (wrongful removal of personal belongings); Lambert v. Sine, 123 Utah 145,
256 P.2d 241 (1953) (personal injury).
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C. "Peaceful" Evictions
This leaves for consideration the situation in which the eviction is
accomplished peacefully. As a practical matter, peaceable eviction usu-
ally requires a fact situation in which the eviction is performed in the
tenant's absence. Often the landlord enters by use of a pass key and
moves the tenant's goods out into the hall or onto the street, or stores
them somewhere. Another technique is known as the "lockout," in
which the lock is changed, or in slum tenements, the door is padlocked.
Here the tenant's goods may be left in the apartment and he will not be
permitted to reenter until arrangements for moving have been made.
The courts have drawn no legal distinctions between the techniques used,
though arguably removal of the tenant's belongings is more detrimental
to the tenant's interests than a "lockout," which does not disturb the
tenant's goods. 195
While self-help evictions can be accomplished peacefully, there is a
high probability that they may degenerate into violent altercations. The
risk of such a consequence inheres in nearly every eviction that begins
peacefully. The landlord may arrive when he thinks, mistakenly, that
the tenant and his family are absent; or he may misjudge the duration
of the tenant's absence and the tenant may return during the moving;
or the moving or lockout may be peacefully performed but a fight may
erupt upon the tenant's return and discovery of what has happened. A
confrontation of the parties in a highly charged atmosphere makes
likely a serious disruption of the peace and embittered feelings by both
parties.
Presumably, the risk of avoiding a disturbance is significantly re-
duced where the eviction is effectuated after legal process by a public
officer who is simply doing his job and is experienced in handling up-
set tenants. Further, the tenant ordinarily has the opportunity to pre-
sent his side at a hearing and is given notice of the eviction before it
occurs.1
96
A peaceful self-help eviction by the landlord was permissible at
195. A third technique is where the landlord turns off utilities, such as water and
heat, within his control to induce the tenant to leave. See note 99 supra.
196. California requires that the lessor first give notice or demand to the lessee
to comply with the lease provisions. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1161. Thereafter,
summons must be served on the lessee, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1166, who must be
given the opportunity to appear and answer the complaint. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC.
§ 1170. If the tenant refuses to surrender the leased premises, the lessor's only rem-
edy is in the legal process afforded by these statutes. See Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal.
2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961); CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1159.
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common law and apparently is still allowed in most American states.
197
In recent years, though, courts in several jurisdictions have held that
even a peaceful self-help eviction is tortious. In the case of Jordan v.
Talbot,"9" the California Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of con-
structive force to find that a landlord who entered the apartment by
use of a pass key and removed the tenant's goods during her absence
had entered by "use of force." The concept of "force" in the con-
text of a forcible eviction statute has traditionally meant force directed
at the person of the tenant and not the technical meaning of the term
as it developed in burglary cases. By the doctrine of constructive force
most jurisdictions could eliminate self-help evictions entirely simply by
redefining the meaning of force. However, it is to be doubted that
most courts are presently prepared to follow the lead of this California
precedent.
Another approach to barring self-help evictions is by judicial
declaration that the legislature, in adopting legislation on summary evic-
tion intended to make this the landlord's exclusive remedy.'99 Un-
doubtedly one of the reasons why the summary eviction acts were
adopted was to encourage the use of legal process. Still, if abolition of
self-help was intended, it probably would have been expressly stated.
It seems presumptuous for a court to proclaim a rationale based on what
it supposes the legislative intention was over a century ago.
D. Proposed Reform
Because of growing pressure to strengthen and clarify the tenant's
rights to possession, and because self-help eviction must be eliminated
to protect the tenant's right adequately, eviction by self-help is a proper
subject for law reform. While it can be anticipated that courts will
limit the use of self-help by landlords, the process will take place in a
piecemeal fashion on the facts of particular cases;;2 10 the number of
courts that will attempt to entirely eliminate the remedy may be small.
197. See note 186 supra.
198. 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961), noted in 9
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 453 (1962).
199. Something of this rationale can be discerned in rulings of the Florida courts.
Ardell v. Milner, 166 So. 2d 714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1961); see Adelhelm v. Dougherty, 129
Fla. 680, 176 So. 775 (1937). But see Barnett, When the Landlord Resorts to Self-
Help: A Plea for Clarification of the Law in Florida, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 238 (1966);
Boyer & Grable, Reform of Landlord-Tenant Statutes to Eliminate Self-Help in Evicting
Tenants, 22 U. MIAmI L. REv. 800 (1968).
200. This is the process that has occurred in Utah, the third state to move strongly
against self-help evictions. See Peterson v. Platt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 P.2d 507
(1965), and cases cited therein.
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It seems probable that any widespread reform will be accomplished
only by legislation.2"'
The Model Code forbids the use even of peaceful self-help evic-
tions by the landlord.0 2 To make this prohibition effective, the ten-
ant is given the choice of recovering possession or terminating the
lease, as well as three months' rent or triple damages, and the costs of
suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.2" 3 These remedies would




At common law, if the tenant defaulted in rent, the landlord had
the right to employ the self-help remedy of seizing such of the tenant's
chattels as he found on the leased premises and holding them until the
tenant paid the rent due.20 4 Later, by statute in England, the landlord
was given the power to sell the tenant's goods at a public auction
and apply the proceeds to the rent due.20 5 This was called the land-
lord's power of distraint.
Apparently the landlord's right of distraint still exists in most
American states although it has been abolished by statute in many states,
particularly in the Midwest. 206  Many northeastern and southern states
have codified the remedy.10 7  A frequent statutory change from the
common law rule requires the landlord to obtain a warrant of distraint
and have it served on the tenant by a court officer at the time of the
201. Note, Self-Help Eviction: Proposals for the Reform of Eviction Procedures
in New Jersey, 1 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. Fall Issue 1969. In 1964 the English Parlia-
ment passed the Protection from Eviction Act, which prohibits self-help evictions in all
residential premises. See Powell-Smith, Self-Help, Possession, and Statutory Control,
4 SOL. QUAR. 97 (1965).
202. MODEL CODE § 2-408.
203. Id.
204. 3A THOMPSON, supra note 16, § 1305, at 481.
205. 2 W. & M., c. 5, § 1 (1689). An alternative remedy of the landlord was
to declare a distraint on the tenant's goods without a seizure of them. This gave the
landlord a nonpossessory lien on the tenant's chattels which was effective against
such other creditors and subsequent purchasers as had notice of the distraint. Id.
The Code expressly abolishes this nonpossessory lien. MODEL CODE § 3-403(1).
206. There is a paucity of secondary literature on this subject. The most useful
discussion the author has found on national law is in Note, Landlord and Tenant: Dis-
tress for Rent, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 505 (1939).
207. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5502 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 61-401
(1935); Ky. REv. STAT. § 383.010 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 53, § 9 (1957); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:33-6 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.302 (1965); S.C. CODE
ANN. tit. 41, § 41-151 (1962).
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distraint. 208  One purpose of this requirement may be to prevent dis-
traint of the tenant's goods where the tenant has not defaulted in rent.
Another reason is the hope that violence may be avoided by having
the seizure accomplished by a court official. In states without this
requirement, or where the right of distraint depends on a provision in
the lease, the exercise of the right by the landlord acting alone is re-
quired to be by peaceable meansY 0 Where a breach of the peace re-
sults from an attempt by the tenant to defend his possession of the prop-
erty, the landlord may be liable for damages.
210
As a result, in those jurisdictions that permit distraint without the
required participation of court officials, the distraint is usually accom-
plished in the same situation as a self-help eviction: at a time when
the tenant is temporarily absent. Thus, the same factual patterns occur
with distraint as are found in self-help evictions, and an exercise of the
right of distraint will usually also constitute an eviction, although the
converse frequently is not true. Moreover, if all self-help evictions are
deemed improper, the remedy of distraint would probably be useless.
If distraint were prohibited, many, but not all, self-help evictions
might also be improper.
B. Exemptions
Almost all states have statutory exemptions to executions on per-
sonal property, phrased in terms of a dollar value of the property ex-
empted from execution, the types of goods exempted, or both.21 '
Occasionally an exemption is found in the distraint statute itself.
212
Unfortunately, the statutory exemptions were generally created in the
last century and have been amended infrequently since that time. As
a result, when phrased in terms of dollar value, they usually do not
take inflation into account.
These exemptions apply to a sale of the tenant's goods.21 3 Appar-
208. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 61-401 (1935); Ky. REv. STAT. § 383.010 (1969);
MD. CODE ANN. art. 53, § 9 (1957); MIss. CODE ANN. § 910 (1942).
209. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, H9 5506, 5520 (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:33-3 (1952); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 41, § 41-152 (1962).
210. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5506, 5520 (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:33-3 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.401 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 41,
§ 41-152 (1962).
211. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 690; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:33-3 (1952);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.401 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 41, § 41-152 (1962).
212. In New Jersey, for example, the distraint statute exempts all clothing, and
any other goods chosen by the tenant up to a value of $500. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:33-3
(1952).
213. See note 211 supra.
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ently, however, landlords are not particularly interested in selling the
property of low-income residential tenants but merely hold it as ransom
for payment of the rent due. For this reason, the exemption is often
ignored at the time the property is seized, and legislation exempting the
property from execution fails to provide for this situation. If the land-
lord is not entitled to sell the tenant's exempt property, a seizure of it in
the first instance should be considered wrongful.21
C. Recovery of Property by the Tenant
When the tenant finds that his goods are impounded in a pad-
locked apartment or a locked storage room, his first impulse may be
to break in and recover his goods. Often the landlord is prepared for
such tactics and a dangerous situation may develop. If trouble occurs
at this stage, a court might hold that the distraint was not accomplished
peacefully and hold the landlord liable for damages. On the other
hand, the law is clear that if after the distraint has been effected the
tenant succeeds in recovering his property, to which the landlord is
entitled to conditional possession, the tenant has committed a tort and
is liable for damages. Since frequently a damage judgment against
such a tenant is worthless, the more prominent risk for the tenant is
that he will be arrested for commiting a breach of the peace or crim-
inal trespass.
The legal means by which a tenant can immediately recover posses-
sion of his household goods is useless to most tenants. The procedure
is to start a suit in the nature of replevin and file a bond. 215  A court
official will then put the tenant back into possession of his goods.
However, the bond is usually required to be for twice the value of
the goods.216 Consequently, the cost of the bond and the security re-
quired for its issuance make paying the back rent a less costly alter-
native.
The landlord's right to distraint often leads to disorderly scrambles
to gain possession of tenant's household goods and includes the risk
of violent breaches of the peace. The hardship to the tenant and his
214. In one recent unreported case in New Jersey the landlord's distraint of
the tenant's clothing, which was specifically exempted from sale, was held to be wrong-
ful and the landlord was liable in damages. Cambium Corp. v. Rowan, No. 492-227
(Monmouth County Dist. Ct. 1969) in 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 79 (1969).
215. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 702 (1953); Miss. CODE ANN. § 917
(1942).
216. In New Jersey the statute has been amended so that the bond need only
cover twice the rent due instead of twice the value of the goods. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:59-5 (Supp. 1969).
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family in having their personal possessions held for ransom is often far
greater than the benefit derived by the landlord. Distraint and sale
of the property of commercial and industrial tenants may be a valuable
and harmless procedure, but when applied to residential tenants it has a
significant potential for causing human misery. Distraint should be
abolished, and the Model Code does so.
2 17
VI. Representation of Indigent Tenants
The most revolutionary proposal of the Model Code is found in
section 3-101:
(1) In any proceeding brought by or for a landlord against a tenant
to recover possession of his dwelling unit, the court shall inform the
tenant of his right to counsel, and if the tenant is unable to afford
his own, the court shall appoint counsel [designate appropriate
source].
(2) A tenant shall be deemed unable to afford a private attorney
when the expenditure therefore would work untoward hardship
on the tenant or his family.
(3) [Provide for payment in accordance with state practice.]
In the commentary the drafters state:
In criminal matters, when an indigent defendant may be de-
prived of life, or liberty. . . we now. . . extend the right to coun-
sel to a criminal defendant regardless of the ability to pay. It is
the thesis of this section that an indigent should also be protected
when his home is in issue.
218
However praiseworthy the object of this proposal may be, its major
shortcoming is the problem of financing the attorney representation re-
quired to implement it. If the Code seeks to force the issue of financ-
ing, it seems clear that this bold tactic will not be adopted by legis-
latures. State legislatures have budgeted funds, albeit insufficient at
present, for public defenders in criminal cases, but only because they
were forced to do as a matter of federal constitutional law.219  How-
ever, there seems no likelihood of a similar constitutional requirement
that indigent tenants be granted free counsel.
As a substitute for the present provision, which has little chance
of adoption, it is suggested that there be a requirement that the sum-
mons provide the address and telephone number of the local legal aid
217. MODEL CODE § 3-403(2). Since the exercise of distraint frequently amounts
to a self-help eviction, defined under section 2-408 of the Code as a "removal" or "ex-
clusion" from the premises except under color of a valid court order, the penalty pro-
visions of that section would apply: three months' rent or triple damages and attorneys
fees.
218. MODEL CODE § 3-101, commentary at 73.
219. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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office. Furthermore, it should notify the tenant that he should contact
this office if his family income is lower than a specified figure and if
he wishes to contest the eviction. 220  Not only is this substitute pro-
vision more likely to be adopted, and in the long run, more likely to
achieve the goal of representation of all indigent tenants, but it is pre-
ferable to the mechanics of the Code provision. A judge would ap-
point counsel at or shortly before the hearing, and this would result
either in insufficient preparation time for counsel to undertake the de-
fense, which would be unfair to the tenant, or a postponement of the
hearing, which would be unfair to the landlord.
VII. Conclusion
The rules of residential landlord-tenant relations, and especially
the rules relating to the practical details of summary eviction procedure,
have long been neglected by legislators, writers and teachers. Con-
sidering the high proportion of our population who are tenants,221 this
record of inattention to matters of intense and important human concern
cannot be viewed with any sense of pride. By default, the outmoded
rules of a previous day have continued to hold sway, modified only by
the practices of landlords, the adhesive terms of standard form leases
and the customs of lower court judges and minor officials. What
knowledge has existed in the past of the practical operation of these rules
has been focused almost entirely on local law. There has been no
national standard against which to make comparisons, to remedy the
shortcomings of local jurisprudence, or to stir enlightened minds into
contemplating reform.
The positing of the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code ful-
fills this need. That a product of this quality was created from such a
meagre and parochial background of published information and crit-
ical thought is a tribute to the drafters, for the Code is an elaborate,
well thought out, detailed proposal for legislation and is worthy of very
serious attention by all concerned. Besides providing a statement of the
national norm by an extensive codification of the most common
220. Something similar to this procedure can be done absent a statute. The New
York State Bar Association reportedly has approved a program instituted by the Legal
Aid Society of Albany under which tenants in low-income areas, against whom sum-
mary dispossess proceedings have been instituted, are notified by a form letter sug-
gesting that they may contact the society if they wish to defend but cannot afford an
attorney. Ops. N.Y.S.B. Ass'N, No. 75, April 3, 1968, in OEO Pov. L. REP. 2200.40,
at 3133.
221. The author estimates that there are about 70 million people in the United
States who rent their dwelling space.
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modem rules, the Code adopts a number of reforms that exist by case
law or statute in only a few jurisdictions and are mostly of recent vintage.
Chief among these are the abolition of self-help evictions and distraint;
without this step, any strengthening of the tenants' rights in summary
eviction proceedings might be self-defeating. Further effectuating the
Code's main concern of providing "procedural decency" to tenants is
the proscription of lease provisions for confession of judgment and
payment of the landlord's attorney fees. In addition, the Code limits
the common statutory penalty of double rent for the overstaying ten-
ant to one month, permits payment of rent at judgment to bar eviction
in good faith disputes, forbids default judgments for rent where the
tenant was not personally served, regulates the landlord's use of ten-
ancy rules for long-term tenants, and requires advance notice of en-
forcement of a warrant of eviction. Further, the Code proposes the re-
quirement that low-income tenants have a right to free counsel to de-
fend possession.
As to the much discussed subject of practical sanctions to induce
landlords to make repairs to the premises, the Code includes a num-
ber of specific rules. It adopts for limited purposes the doctrine of the
so-called implied covenant of habitability and particularizes the conse-
quences of failure to supply certain utilities and services: reduction
of rent for failure to provide adequate hot water, and abatement of
rent and partial cost of temporary substitute housing for the failure to
supply a reasonable amount of water or heat. Further, the landlord is
placed under the duty to maintain the premises and make repairs to
comply with applicable housing codes. This more general duty to the
tenant is enforceable by deduction from the rent of the cost of repairs
made by the tenant, a suit or counterclaim for damages, or termination
of the relation without liability for future rent if the conditions fall
within a liberalized restatement of the doctrine of constructive eviction.
Where drastic rehabilitation of a building is necessary, the Code pro-
vides for a sophisticated receivership remedy. Beyond these items, the
function of enforcement of minimum housing standards is left to housing
code ordinances and officials. Protection of the short-term tenant in
availing himself of the Code remedies and the efforts of housing code
officials is provided in an elaborate section that forstalls retaliatory evic-
tions.
On the other hand, some changes in the law advocated on behalf
of tenants were not adopted. The list of rejected proposals includes a
general right to remain in possession without liability for rent where the
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building contains serious housing code violatons, 2-2 a blanket protec-
tion for rent strikes, 22 3 a lengthening of the minimum term of periodic
tenancy or requirement that eviction be only for cause, 224 discretionary
postponement of eviction on grounds of hardship,225 and abolition of the
requirements of bonding for appeals. 2
On balance, the Code would clearly strengthen the rights of ten-
ants in all or nearly all states. Some provisions in the Code, however,
would benefit landlords by overturning outmoded rules still existing
in a few states, which can be avoided only by written lease provisions.
The Code benefits the landlord in providing that rent is due in advance,
that the cost of repairs due to tenant damage may be added to rent,
227
that a judgment can be given for rent due up to the day of judgment,
and that the landlord has the right to enter the rented premises for in-
spection. 228  Further, the Code permits substituted service, and the
Code's commentary supplies support for the elimination of jury trials.
In most jurisdictions, the above changes would seem to be small
compared to the sweeping changes afforded tenants under the Model
Code. Besides, most of these reforms of benefit to landlords would
not help large investors and managers who already use printed leases,
and it is these people who will probably have the greatest individual
influence on legislators. One might wonder what would induce land-
lords to support, or even tolerate, adoption of the Code.
For the landlord, the price of the Code's adoption should be calcu-
lated with an eye more to the future than to the present. It should be
evaluated by looking to the tenant-oriented changes that the Code draft-
ers declined to adopt. There are at least some prospects that the adop-
tion of the Code would forestall a later movement toward more drastic
legislative changes. In addition, the legislative adoption of specific rules
would act as a deterrent to liberal judicial interpretation of vague pres-
ent rules, and in general would slow the rate of judicial erosion of the
landlord's rights.
222. See note 115 & accompanying text supra.
223. Id.
224. See note 163 & accompanying text supra.
225. See note 44 & accompanying text supra.
226. See note 51 & accompanying text supra.
227. MODEL CODE § 2-304(1)(a). Apparently, however, the landlord can do this
only if he has actually made the repairs. The same condition applies where the tenancy
has terminated and the landlord claims the deposit or a portion thereof to cover tenant-
caused damages. Id. § 2-401(2).
228. MODEL CODE § 2-405.
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Landlords and their advisors should be aware that, justly or not,
public sentiment is rapidly shifting away from a neutral position on
residential landlord-tenant problems. New bases of political influence
are taking shape that are intensely antagonistic to the interests of the
investor and manager of rental properties. The influence of those
groups is just beginning to be felt in the courts and legislatures. In a
few years, the situation may well be that legislation and court decisions
that are intolerably oppressive to landlords will be imposed in an excess
of zeal by power organs that are no longer responsive to the needs of
landlords or their pleas for fairness. In the light of what an uncertain
but predictably unpleasant future may hold in store, the Model Code
may very well be viewed by landlords as a bargain.
Lest landlords and their advisors view this argument as scare propa-
ganda, the author would bring to their attention a recently enacted
statute of the State of Maryland, applicable at present only to the City of
Baltimore, which provides in effect that a landlord shall not be per-
mitted to evict a tenant, despite default in rent, where the premises con-
tain important housing code violations. 229  Such a rule would cause
serious problems for a large proportion of landlords, and it is all the
more disturbing to landlords to realize that the bill was signed into law
by no less a radical than former Governor, now Vice-President, Spiro
Agnew.
The Model Code was prepared in an attempt to balance the tenant's
legitimate desires for procedural fairness and for guarantees of at least
minimum quality of housing and services, against the realistic concern
that overly drastic changes in the present law would result in a further
frightening of private capital away from investment in badly needed new
rental housing, especially in the middle-income rental range. While the
solutions proposed in light of these competing consideration are cer-
tainly debatable, it is clear that the Model Code represents a serious
attempt to achieve equilibrium. A significant service has been rendered
by this effort, but this is only today's attempt. The balance thought
appropriate in the new future, one may predict, will be more harsh to
the landlord.
229. BALTIMORE, MD., CODE PUB. Loc. LAWS § 459A (1968), added by Law of
July 1, 1968, ch. 459, § 1, [19681 Md. Laws 832.
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